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A PRIMER ON POWER BALANCING
UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
James B. Zimarowski*
If there is no struggle there is no progress. Those who
profess to favor freedom and yet deprecate agitation, are
men who want crops without plowing up the ground; they
want rain without thunder and lightning. They want the
ocean without the awful roar of its many waters.
This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physi-
cal one, and it may be both moral and physical, but it
must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a de-
mand. It never did and it never will .... Men may not
get all that they pay for in this world, but they certainly
pay for all they get.
-Frederick Douglass1
* B.S., West Virginia Institute of Technology, 1974; M.B.A., Marshall University,
1976; M.A., Marshall University, 1977; J.D., West Virginia University, 1982; LL.M., Uni-
versity of Illinois, 1985.
1. Speech by Frederick Douglass, delivered at Canandaigua, New York (Aug. 4,
1857), reprinted in 2 F. DOUGLASS, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 437
(P. Foner ed. 1950).
Conflict between employees and employers is inevitable. Labor historians can trace
'labor power confrontations as far back as 1619 in the Jamestown colony. W. CAHN, A
PICTORIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 60 (1972) (citing records of the Virginia Com-
pany dated July 21, 1619). Unions are a natural response to the needs of employees to
counter the power response by the employer. Unions are not, as many conservative writ-
ers would like to believe, conspiracies of the left or extensions of organized crime. They
are merely organizations, arising from the course of events, designed to serve a purpose
or fill a need akin to other business, trade, fraternal, or educational organizations. Un-
ions are dynamic and diversified. Robert Hoxie observed:
[T~he union program, taking it with all its mutations and contradictions, com-
prehends nothing less than all the various economic, political, ethical and social
viewpoints and modes of action of a vast and heterogeneous complex of working
class groups, molded by diverse environments and actuated by diverse motives;
it expresses nothing less than the ideals, aspirations, hopes, and fears, modes of
thinking and action of all these working groups. In short, if we can think of
unionism as such, it must be as one of the most complex, heterogeneous and
protean of modern social phenomena.
R. HOXIE, TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 35 (1936). Given this nature, the union
is also one of the most vulnerable to destabilization.
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The scope of the legislative policy behind the National Labor
Relations Act 2 (NLRA or Act) has been the subject of almost
continuous debate for over fifty years. The unranked policy
goals of the Act include: (1) the reduction in disruptions to in-
terstate commerce caused by industrial conflict between employ-
ers and labor organizations, (2) the encouragement of the collec-
tive bargaining process, (3) the encouragement of industrial
democracy, and (4) the facilitation of employer-employee con-
flict resolution.3 Additional economic goals arguably include the
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
3. National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Many treatments of the
NLRA make fleeting references to the policy of the Act. The policy of the Act deserves a
closer reading:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the
refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead
to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or
the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the
efficiency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occur-
ring in the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or control-
ling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods from or into
the channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in commerce;
or (d) causing diminution of employment and wages in such volume as substan-
tially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into the channels
of commerce.
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are or-
ganized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent busi-
ness depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage
earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment,
or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recog-
nized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamen-
tal to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as
to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bar-
gaining power between employers and employees.
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor or-
ganizations, their officers, and members have the intent or the necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods in such
commerce through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or through con-
certed activities which impair the interest of the public in the free flow of such
commerce. The elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to the as-
surance of the rights herein guaranteed.
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the prac-
tice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id.; see also A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY (1960); C. GREGORY & H.
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wage-push effect of increased wages on consumer demand in a
recession economy and the attendant economic stimulation of
depressed industries." The mechanisms to achieve these policy
considerations involve the legislative establishment of a balance
of power between employees and employers. 5
With the recognition that there can be no freedom of contract
unless there is freedom to contract, the NLRA established statu-
tory rights designed to facilitate the creation of institutional
structures to organize and represent employees.' Individual bar-
KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1979). The NLRA was designed to smooth out the
roller coaster of economics and achieve the higher aspirations of increased long-term eco-
nomic, political, social, and educational growth for the public good. See generally 2
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 (1948); 2
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935 (1949). Both
labor and management easily overlook the long-term interrelationships and public pur-
pose in favor of short-term gains, but the Act requires this perspective. See Marshall,
The Future of the American Labor Movement: The Role of Federal Law, 57 CHI.J-]KENT
L. REV. 521, 526-31 (1981); Summers, Past Premises, Present Failures, and Future
Needs in Labor Legislation, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 9 (1982); see also R. FREEMAN & J.
MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984).
4. See supra note 3. National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
5. Reduction of conflict through the use of power balancing mechanisms is not novel
now nor was it at the enactment of the NLRA. Early common law and statutes were ill-
suited to construct systems of remedies beyond those for protection from physical coer-
cion. The property and liberty for which employees seek protection, while necessarily
including protection from physical coercion, also includes protection from economic coer-
cion. As an early English jurist noted, "necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men,
but, to answer a present exigency, will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose
upon them." Vernon v. Bethell, 2 Eden 110, 113, 28 Eng. Rep. 838, 839 (1762).
The lack of a legal forum to redress conflict occasioned by economic coercion, or, in
many cases, a legal forum actively against labor interests is well documented in labor
history. Control of historical court bias against labor organizations was part of the ra-
tionale for the Act. See Policy Statements at 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); see also Anti-In-
junction (Norris-LaGuardia) Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982). The result of un-
redressed conflict led to labor confrontations of unusual intensity and violence. Among
the more notorious power imbalances in labor history were the use of yellow dog con-
tracts (requiring, as a condition of employment, that an employee would have no contact
with union organizers) and labor injunctions.
For a contrary view see Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of
the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983). Professor Epstein argues that
the common law provided sufficient and adequate protections for employees; therefore,
the labor laws were an unwarranted interference. Compare the responses by Getman &
Kohler, The Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Response to Professor Epstein,
92 YALE L.J. 1415 (1983), and Verkuil, Whose Common Law for Labor Relations?, 92
YALE L.J. 1409 (1983) (pointing out the selective and static nature of Epstein's common
law as well as the realities of conflict and power exercises).
6. National Labor Relations Act, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). The Act states:
Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
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gains were replaced by the collective bargain, thereby facilitating
a measure of group protection from economic coercion.' The ar-
ticulation and enforcement of unfair labor practices allowed
many employer-employee labor union conflicts to be overseen in
impartial forums.8
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title
[§ 8(a)(3) of the Act].
In H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970), the Court stated:
The object of this Act was . . . to ensure that employers and their employees
could work together to establish mutually satisfactory conditions. The basic
theme of the Act was that through collective bargaining the passions, arguments,
and struggles of prior years would be channeled into constructive, open discus-
sions leading, it was hoped, to mutual agreement.
7. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
[Labor unions] were organized out of the necessities of the situation. A single
employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was dependent ordinarily
on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the employer
refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to
leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was essen-
tial to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their employer.
Id. at 209.
According to NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (footnotes omitted)
(1967):
National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their eco-
nomic strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the ma-
jority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of
bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. The pol-
icy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own rela-
tions with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative
to act in the interests of all employees . . . . Thus only the union may contract
the employee's terms and conditions of employment, and provisions for process-
ing his grievances; the union may even bargain away his right to strike during
the contract term, and his right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line. The em-
ployee may disagree with many of the union decisions but is bound by them.
8. For an articulation of unfair practices, see National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)-
(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)-(b) (1982). Other rights are enforced through systems of private
ordering established in collectively-bargained grievance and arbitration forums.
The Act does not include the violation of contract terms as an unfair labor practice.
An early version of the Labor Management Relations Act contained an 8(a)(6) provision
making it an unfair labor practice "to violate the terms of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment or the terms of an agreement to submit a labor dispute to arbitration .... 'IS.
1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 111 (1948). Section 8(b)(5) contained a similar provi-
sion applicable to labor organizations. Id. at 16, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 114 (1948). Both provisions were
struck from the final Act. This does not imply that the Board and the courts are pre-
cluded from examining contract language, only that such inquiries depend upon unfair
labor practice provisions or contract enforcement through the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421
(1967); see also J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). The "Steelworkers Trilogy"
held that arbitration, as a private ordered dispute resolution forum, is shown great defer-
ence. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960) (determina-
tion of arbitrability is a proper function of the arbitrator); United Steelworkers v. War-
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The exercise of power under the NLRA can be viewed in three
interrelated contexts. First, express statutory limitations or ap-
proval are placed upon identified power exercises.' Second, a
class of power exercises are channeled through the mediating ef-
fects of the collective bargaining process in the form of
mandatory bargaining items. 10 Collaterally, the mandatory-per-
missive bargaining item dichotomy created by the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 8(d) defines an area of
power exercises that is not channeled through the potential me-
diating effects of the collective bargaining process. The Act pro-
tects this area from responsive power exercises through the
8(a)(5)and 8(b)(3) good faith bargaining obligation." Third, the
NLRA was built upon an existing employer-employee relation-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960) (doubts as to coverage of
arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of coverage); United Steelworkers v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (arbitration awards entitled to court
enforcement if they draw their essence from the contract) [hereinafter Steelworkers Tril-
ogy]. See generally Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
61 CALIF. L. REV. 663 (1973); Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts,
78 YALE L.J. 525 (1969).
9. Principal among these are the statutory restrictions on secondary activity, hot
cargo clauses, picketing, and the permanent replacement of economic and sympathy
strikers. See infra notes 143-195 and accompanying text. See generally Atleson, Reflec-
tions on Labor, Power and Society, 44 MD. L. REV. 841 (1985).
10. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. 158(d) (1982) provides:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agree-
ment, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written con-
tract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession: Provided, That where there is in effect a collective bar-
gaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty
to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall termi-
nate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or
modification-
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the pro-
posed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof,
or . . . sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or
modification; (2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose
of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed
modifications;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days
after such notice of the existence of a dispute . . .; and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all
the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after
such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever oc-
curs later.
11. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); see also
Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978). In practical terms, iden-
tifying the mandatory subjects of bargaining is crucial, for such matters must be dis-
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ship based on custom and common law. It embraces a private
ordered preference for dispute resolution within the NLRA
framework.12 Consequently, custom and common-law based ar-
ticulations of respective rights and duties related to contract in-
terpretation, employee discipline, freedom of expression, privacy
considerations, protection of property rights, and other related
matters, create areas of employer-employee power exercises.13 It
is important, however, to recognize the dispute resolution fo-
rum's role in approving or disapproving power exercises, within
these three contexts, based upon the elusive concept of serving
public purpose or public policy. 4
The focus of this Article is twofold. First, it addresses the sub-
stantive power control mechanisms established and regulated by
the National Labor Relations Board (Board) and the courts.
Second, it examines the power balancing methodology embraced
by these dispute resolution forums. This Article takes the posi-
tion that power balancing analysis designed to achieve the
NLRA's multidimensional policies is a more fruitful endeavor
than the analysis of economic efficiency or a partisan approach
subject to political considerations.
At first glance, such a position hardly raises significant ques-
tions. Recently, however, the "Law and Economics" advocates
have taken a more aggressive posture. They attach a narrowly
bounded economic efficiency policy rationale to the NLRA as a
threshold consideration in determining the legal propriety of
particular power exercises within the ambit of labor-manage-
cussed in bargaining sessions before any unilateral action with respect to them is taken.
Id. at 725.
12. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
13. All organizations have rules; law is a subset of the broader category of working
rules in society. According to Professor John Commons:
Law was looked upon, not as the working rules of a going concern adopted by
the participants in a world of limited resources according to the principle of
scarcity, but as a mechanical unfolding of ideal concepts of liberty, justice and
law. The individual was the unit, liberty the goal and law the mechanism. Yet
every concern must have its working rules which are its laws. These spring from
authority, custom, habit, initiative, or what not. They are the common law, the
statute law, the equity jurisprudence of the concern. The state, the business con-
cern and the cultural concern are alike in their dependence on these working
rules, the difference being mainly in the kind of sanctions, whether physical,
economic, or moral, which they can bring to bear in enforcing the rules. And the
declarations and enforcement of the rules create a complete outfit of rights, du-
ties, liberties and exposures of each member occupying each position in the par-
ticular concern.
J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 332-33 (1924). For an interesting discus-
sion of working rules vis-A-vis contract rules in the collective bargaining setting, see
Feller, supra note 8, at 774-804.
14. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
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ment confrontations.1 5 For example, the Board's recent treat-
ment of power exercises in Harter Equipment,16 Clear Pine
Mouldings,17 and Otis Elevator' suggests a need to reexamine
15. See, e.g., Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. Cmi. L. REV. 988 (1984);
Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1987).
16. 280 N.L.R.B. 597 (1986). In Harter Equipment, the Board was asked to deter-
mine if the hiring of temporary replacements after an offensive employer lockout harmed
protected employee rights. This is a classic case of the employer imposing a cost of non-
compliance upon the employees for exercising their organizational and bargaining rights.
It presents a common balancing of interests problem under the NLRA. It should be
noted that a strike had not been called. The employees were ready and willing to con-
tinue their labor, and although the contract had expired, the parties were still at the
bargaining table. Balancing the employees' statutory rights against an employer's prerog-
ative to continue operations on its own unilateral terms, the Board held that using tem-
porary replacements during an offensive lockout had "a comparatively slight adverse ef-
fect on protected employee rights." Id. at 600. The Board almost reverently approached
the employer's prerogative and power to continue operations using ostensibly temporary
replacements. One can view the Board's methodological approach as highly suspect in
light of labor history and NLRA policy. "We reject the argument that the Board should
require more proof of an employer's legitimate purpose in such a case or should engage
in balancing employer interests against employee rights to determine whether the Act
has been violated, even in the absence of independent proof of unlawful employer moti-
vation." Id.; see also International Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local 88 v. NLRB, 858 F.2d
756 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Compare infra note 162 (evidentiary burden imposed upon em-
ployer in replacement of sympathy striker cases) with infra note 191 (evidentiary burden
in reinstatement denial of economic replacements). In effect, the employer, solely in
command of the information necessary to sustain its position, is not to be questioned in
a timely manner, but simply accepted at its word. See generally Meltzer, Lockouts: Licit
and Illicit, in N.Y.U. 16TH CONF. ON LABOR 19 (1963); Meltzer, Lockouts Under the
LMRA: New Shadows on an Old Terrain, 28 U. Cmi. L. REv. 614 (1961); Meltzer, Single-
Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 24 U. Cmi. L. REV.
70 (1956); Oberer, Lockouts and the Law: The Impact of American Shipbuilding and
Brown Food, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 193 (1966).
17. 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984). The Board was asked to address the issue of protected
vis-a-vis unprotected strike conduct. In a 2-2 decision, with the concurring opinion de-
cided narrowly, the Dotson Board chose to recast the decision as a stinging indictment
on labor's principal power source-the strike weapon. Although easily sustainable on
more narrow grounds, the Board denied the reinstatement, allowing the employer unfet-
tered use of its discipline and discharge power against strikers engaged in the employer's
definition of "strike misconduct." The language in the decision goes far beyond the de-
nial of reinstatement for the commission of unlawful or even tortious acts. The Board
instead chose an easier standard for employers to justify discipline and discharge, and
created a trap for unsophisticated employees:
[W]e reject the per se rule that words alone can never warrant a denial of rein-
statement in the absence of physical acts . . . .[and adopt] the following objec-
tive test for determining whether verbal threats by strikers directed at fellow
employees justify an employer's refusal to reinstate: "[Wihether the misconduct
is such that, under the circumstances existing, it may reasonably tend to coerce
or intimidate employees in the exercise of rights protected under the Act."
Id. at 1046 (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted).
Thus, heated "fighting words" that "reasonably tend" to invoke response but are short
of criminal or tortious conduct, may be unprotected. Compare this with the standard
used to assess employer interference with employee rights. Harter Equip. Inc., 280
N.L.R.B. at 600. Does not the offensive lockout of employees who are ready, willing, and
able to work "reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of rights
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the fundamental issues in power balancing and the interdepen-
dency of power exercises with the protection of rights under the
NLRA.19 Casting issues in narrow economic bounds disserves the
protected under the Act"? Apparently, the Board places great stock in the identity of
the speaker to assess the coercive impact of the communications. See, e.g., Midland Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982) (misrepresentations will no longer be the basis for
overturning representation elections).
A second point is equally striking. Under Clear Pine Mouldings and the command-
obedience structure, employers, rather than the state, are the vicarious protectors of em-
ployee rights, even removed in time and place from the job. One wonders who is the
actual party of interest-the employer, protecting one of his factors of production, or the
"intimidated" employee.
The NLRA does not preempt state criminal and public safety laws. Criminal actions
may be brought against participants in labor confrontations. Moreover, time, place, and
manner restrictions are available as a civil remedy to protect property interests and pub-
lic safety. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284
(1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1940).
In Clear Pine Mouldings, the Board continues its reverence for employer positioning
with a second general proposition regarding alleged strike misconduct. The Board will no
longer balance the "severity of the employer's unfair labor practices that provoked the
strike against the gravity of the striker's misconduct." 268 N.L.R.B. at 1047 (footnote
omitted). This analysis not only allows the employer to define the propriety of conduct
but arguably allows an employer to "set up" employees and thereby profit from its initial
wrong. See generally Note, Reinstatement of Unfair Labor Practice Strikers Who En-
gage in Strike-Related Misconduct: Repudiation of the Thayer Doctrine by Clear Pine
Mouldings, 8 INDus. REL. L.J. 226 (1986) (authored by Renauer). The Board may be
backing away from the literal reach of this position. See Catalytic, Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 97
(1985); MGM Grand Hotel, 275 N.L.R.B. 1015 (1985); National Council of Young Israel,
276 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1985); see also Richmond Recording Corp. v. NLRB, 836 F.2d 289
(7th Cir. 1987). This direction is perhaps further solidified with Member Dotson no
longer on the Board as of December 1987.
18. 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984). In Otis Elevator, the Board limited the category of
mandatory bargaining items in regard to employer movements of bargaining unit work to
a narrow labor cost basis:
Included within Section 8(d), however, in accordance with the teachings of
Fibreboard, are all decisions which turn upon a reduction of labor costs. This is
true whether the decision may be characterized as subcontracting, reorganiza-
tion, consolidation, or relocation, if the decision in fact turns on direct modifica-
tion of labor costs and not a change in the basic direction or nature of the
enterprise.
Id. at 893 (emphasis added).
Whether this narrow focus will be adopted by the subsequent members of the Board is
questionable. Nevertheless, it raises the crucial question of issue definition and verifica-
tion because employers can easily tailor business judgment rationales to exploit the cur-
rent Board's narrow views. The Board seemingly places great confidence in the legiti-
macy of employer issue definition, ignoring labor history and the policy of the Act. See
Arrow Automotive Indus. v. NLRB 853 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1988); Local 2179, United
Steelworkers v. NLRB, 822 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1987); Shell Ray Mining, Inc., 286
N.L.R.B. No. 41, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,054 (Sept. 30, 1987). See generally
Zimarowski, The Viability of the Collective Bargaining Process: Corporate Transforma-
tions as Unchanneled Bargaining Power, 3 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 137 (1986).
19. The NLRB has been admonished by the Court for attempting to dictate the sub-
stance of the collective bargaining agreement to the parties. The Court addressed the
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analysis by writing out larger noneconomic interests. Addition-
ally, even if a balance is articulated, as Justice Brennan argued
in his First National Maintenance dissent,20 the analysis must
include substantive components, not merely conclusionary state-
ments. It is not enough to state, for example, that the employer's
interest in maintaining operational continuity outweighs the em-
ployees' collective rights.
The balancing analysis embraces two tiers of inquiry; one tier
is largely conceptual, the other practical. The first tier examines
the scope and methodological approaches to the balancing anal-
ysis. Embracing the policies of the NLRA, it commands the in-
clusion of boih noneconomic and economic interests in the anal-
ysis. But interest articulations do not fully explain the end
product of the analysis-how one set of interests is enhanced
over those of another. This how inquiry is the second tier of the
analysis. Power exercises are the currency that is controlled to
the detriment or benefit of the interests articulated. These
power exercises must be substantively articulated, their interde-
pendency recognized and weighed in furtherance of NLRA pol-
icy through the balancing analysis.
Part II of this Article addresses the first tier of the balancing
analysis and provides a policy perspective on the NLRA. It ar-
ticulates the methodological differences between a power context
approach and the economic efficiency approach. Part II, argues
that focusing narrowly on the economics ignores the richness
related issue of the lockout as a channeled cost of noncompliance in American Ship
Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965):
"[W]hen the Board moves in this area ...it is functioning as an arbiter of the
sort of economic weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain acceptance of
their bargaining demands. It has sought to introduce some standard of properly
'balanced' bargaining power, or some new distinction of justifiable and unjustifi-
able, proper and 'abusive' economic weapons into ... the Act. . . . We have
expressed our belief that this amounts to the Board's entrance into the substan-
tive aspects of the bargaining process to an extent Congress has not
countenanced."
Id. at 317-18 (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497-498
(1960)); see also Harter Equip., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 597 (1986).
As argued in this Article, however, the Board does dictate the substance of collective
bargaining agreements and influences the power exercises of the parties through the
mandatory-permissive bargaining item dichotomy, the balancing process, and the articu-
lation of rights and duties under the Act. To state otherwise is to ignore reality in favor
of pristine views of the labor management relationship. Unless, or until, the Congress
drafts more comprehensive legislation, this power balancing is a function of the dispute
resolution forums. Indeed, it is their functional duty.
20. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 688-91 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); see also J. ATLESON, VALUES AND AssuMrIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
132-35 (1983). See generally Litvin, Fearful Asymmetry: Employee Free Choice and
Employer Profitability in First National Maintenance, 58 IND. L.J. 433 (1983).
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and complexity of the employment relationship. Moreover, the
balancing of interests approach used in legal analysis is signifi-
cantly different from, and preferable to, the cost-benefit analysis
generally used in the economic context. Part II also expands
upon the concept of power within the NLRA framework and its
impact on the traditional custom-/common law-based employee-
employer relationship.
Part III of this Article addresses the second tier of the balanc-
ing analysis. It continues the theme that fulfillment of NLRA
policies are best achieved through an examination of power exer-
cises placed in an overall balancing of interests context. Sub-
stantive power exercises, drawn from both the NLRA and com-
mon law sources, are represented in the familiar T-chart
format.21 Substantive power sources, however, are situational
and dynamic. The power balancing approach commands, and
this section provides, an examination of substantive power
sources in the bargaining, employer discipline and discharge,
and express power control contexts of the NLRA.
Building from the balancing articulations and the substantive
sources of power, the courts and the Board have developed
methodological shorthands to represent various interest calcula-
tions. Such approaches involve not only the question of which
power exercises to control but also suggest the order in which
the interests should be protected.2 Regardless of the shorthand
adopted, the tribunal makes a threshold determination regard-
ing the propriety of the power exercise in the overall context of
the policies of the NLRA. The concluding section of this Article
argues that proper interest/power balancing must draw from the
broad analytical base developed throughout the Article. Hence,
the utility of a primer on power balancing.
21. As argued throughout this Article, following an institutional methodology re-
quires an articulation of the descriptive components of the legal balancing of interests
embracing a broad interdisciplinary base. The T-Chart offers a convenient format for
descriptive comparative treatment and a focal point for public policy debate.
22. The "test" used in judicial decision making embraces a classification of interests
and determines outcome through the allocation of burdens of proof and persuasion. See
Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, (Pts I & II), 4 INDUST.
REL. L.J. 335, 680 (1981); see also Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)(1) and




I. THE FIRST TIER: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
A. The NLRA: An Institutionalist Perspective
One of the unspoken but inherently interesting questions in
any public policy analysis is the methodological approach em-
braced by the body-politic decision maker. Every participant in
a decision-making process carries intellectual baggage that colors
the analysis.2 3 Human directed processes can never be com-
pletely bias free; but with an understanding of the methodologi-
cal issues, the process can be structured to mitigate the intrusion
of unwarranted bias. Methodological issues have particular im-
portance in the areas of labor law and labor relations. Few areas
of law so actively embrace virtually all areas of society's working
rules. In addition, few areas of law are so strongly influenced by
unarticulated notions of class relationships, polemic economic
and liberty valuations, structural conflicts between political or-
ganizations and societal structures, and authoritarian private or-
ganizations and relationships. 4
Labor law, because it has a significant impact on the domestic
economy, would seem to be a fertile area for Law and Economics
proponents to ply their particular methodological trade. 5 The
legal literature is beginning to reflect this perspective. More im-
portantly, many current Board decisions fit within this perspec-
tive. 6 The Law and Economics proponents argue that the para-
23. See generally H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 1976); J. ATLESON, supra note 20.
24. The employment relationship is central to most members of society. From this
they draw identity and, in large part, a political, social, and economic value system. See
infra notes 42-44.
25. The Law and Economics proponents are not necessarily a cohesive group, as is
evident from the contrasting writings in the field. The major Law and Economics propo-
nents, Posner, supra note 15, and Epstein, supra note 5, adopt the "Chicago School"
approach of neoclassical economics to their law and economics analysis. Because they are
both prolific and influential, they require a response. See Liebhafsky, Price Theory as
Jurisprudence: Law and Economics, Chicago Style, 10 J. ECON. ISSUES 23 (1976).
Among the distinguishing characteristics of the "Chicago School" proponents are: (1) a
"polar position among economists as advocates of an individualistic market economy";
(2) the placement of great emphasis upon the usefulness and relevance of neoclassical
economic (price) theory; (3) the equation of actual and ideal markets; (4) the application
of price theory in every societal transaction; and (5) the placement of great emphasis
upon the econometric testing of hypotheses. Liebhafsky, supra, at 41 n.2, (citing Miller,
On the Chicago School of Economics, 70 J. POLITICAL ECONOMY 64-70 (1962)).
26. See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 15; see also Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891
(1984); Milwaukee Spring Div., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee II), aff'd on other
grounds, UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (applying law and economics
theory).
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mount statutory purpose behind the NLRA is simply
efficiency.2 '7 Based on Richard Posner's general proposition that
"the ultimate question for decision in many lawsuits is what al-
location of resources would maximize economic efficiency, '28 the
decision making process is guided by the market value of the
various parties' interests.29 As a result, Law and Economics pro-
ponents argue, a decision should maximize the economic effi-
ciency of the parties.30
Perhaps the most discussed foundational proposition from
Law and Economics proponents is the Coase Theorem. Accord-
ing to Professor Coase, assuming that a free market governs all
behavior and that no transaction costs exist, all transactions will
reach economic efficiency exclusively vii bargaining transac-
tions." Within this view, the presence or absence of legal rules
and entitlements are unimportant at best, or at worst, interfere
with market forces.3 2 Although having a certain appeal, the
methodological implications of adopting such a proposition as
the paramount tenet of legal decision making are significant.
Applying the talisman of economic efficiency to legal policy
analysis can result in significant distortions of reality.33 The
hallmark of the neoclassical economic models is predictive real-
ism." To predict obviates the need to explain, but predictive re-
alism emanates from mathematically testable, principally linear
and static models.35 The models are intentionally (and prefera-
bly) of a highly simplified structure. The bases of these predic-
tive models are, first, a set of universal laws or truths (e.g., a free
market bargaining model always attains economic efficiency)
and, second, antecedent conditions or "the set of assumptions
under which [the] theory is expected to be valid."3 To provide
27. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
28. Id. at 491.
29. Liebhafsky, supra note 25, at 24; see also, Kelman, Consumption Theory, Pro-
duction Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979); Sam-
uels, The Coase Theorem and the Study of Law and Economics, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1
(1974).
30. Liebhafsky, supra note 25, at 26; Kelman, supra note 29, at 673-75.
31. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1-15 (1960).
32. Id.; cf. Liebhafsky, The Problem of Social Cost-An Alternative Approach, 13
NAT. RESOURCES J. 615, 633-91 (1973) (an economic and legal analysis of Coase's theory
and presentation of an alternative).
33. See Kelman, supra note 29, at 669; Lowry, Bargain and Contract Theory in Law
and Economics, 10 J. ECON. ISSUES 1 (1976).
34. See Dugger, Methodological Differences Between Institutional and Neoclassical
Economics, 13 J. ECON. ISSUES 899 (1974).
35. See M. FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 14 (1953).
36. MacKenzie & House, Paradigm Development in the Social Sciences: A Proposed
Research Strategy, 1978 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 7, 8.
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the necessary mathematical rigor, the models must contain em-
pirical content that can be statistically confirmed. Because they
assume discordant metaphysical criteria out of the analysis,
however, their subjectively selected universal truths and antece-
dent conditions are virtually incapable of falsification. 37 As a re-
sult, the methodology is subjective-it assumes away discordant
information and biases the results, while steadfastly proclaiming
an adherence to objectivity and a logical positivist meth-
odology.
3 s
Economics, of course, does play a role. But the economic
methodology, as practiced by the Law and Economics propo-
nents from the Chicago School, has severe methodological limi-
tations. Consider, for example, the terms "cot-benefit analysis"
(in economics) and "balancing of interests" (in the judicial pro-
cess). A cost-benefit study is "a statement of the quantitative
judgments of the economist making the study that preferences
are to be maximized and price is a measure of social value"39
following a set of universal principles and antecedent conditions.
It is, under close scrutiny, merely a narrow piece of evidence
which fits into a larger analysis-a legal balancing of interests.4 °
As a piece of subjectively based evidence, it should be treated as
any other polemic proposition in the legal analysis. To grant the
law and economic propositions greater weight under the guise of
scientific truth is methodologically unsound, and disserves the
,analysis.
Employment and occupation have a far greater significance
than mere economic subsistence. 4' They mold and in turn are
37. Wilber & Harrison, The Methodological Basis of Institutional Economics: Pat-
tern Model, Storytelling, and Holism, 12 J. EcoN. ISSUES 61, 68-70 (1978).
38. See Boulding, Economics as a Moral Science, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1969).
39. Liebhafsky, supra note 32, at 622; see also Boulding, supra note 38 (discussing
the utility and criticisms of the cost benefit analysis). Cf. Posner, The Law and Econom-
ics Movement, 77 AM. EcON. REV. 1 (1987).
40. Liebhafsky, supra note 32, at 623.
41. See generally R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 3; T. KOCHAN & H. KATZ,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (2d ed. 1988).
This position has been implicitly attacked by the Law and Economics approach es-
poused by the Chicago School rendering complex societal interactions subordinate to a
myopic economic efficiency methodology. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 27; Coase,
supra note 31. For an application of these theoretical arguments to the collective bar-
gaining process see, Schwab, supra note 15. Cf. Kelman, supra note 29; Liebhafsky,
supra note 25; Liebhafsky, supra note 32; see also Zimarowski, Public Purpose, Law,
and Economics: J. R. Commons and the Institutional Paradigm Revisited, 90 W. VA. L.
REV. 387 (1988).
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molded by various institutions and by society at large.4"
Through the elusive concept of the public good or public pur-
pose, the legal and social support for employment and occupa-
tional reward is that the collective's "classification of activities
in the body politic [is] deemed to be of value to the rest of the
public rather than a classification of individuals. 43 Through the
42. Employment and occupation influence the value structure of the individuals. This
means progress toward political democracy and related concepts of justice as well as in-
dustrial democracy can be enhanced or constrained by institutional rules.
Individuals . . .learn the custom of language, of co6peration with other individ-
uals, of working towards common ends, of negotiations to eliminate conflicts of
interest, of subordination to the working rules of the many concerns of which
they are members. They meet each other, not as physiological bodies moved by
glands, nor as "globules of desire" moved by pain and pleasure, similar to the
forces of physical and animal nature, but as prepared more or less by habit,
induced by the pressure of custom, to engage in those highly artificial transac-
tions created by the collective human will.
J. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS PLACE IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 73-74 (1934)
(footnote omitted).
Production . ..involves, not only the making of goods to gratify existing wants,
but also the creation and guidance of demand, the whole process of bargaining
and negotiation by which the terms of division are settled, and the underlying
function of defining and enforcing rights of person and property, which deter-
mines to just what extent business can be parasitic and still remain legal. And in
a more fundamental way still, the individual is so molded in body, mind, and
character by his economic activities and relations, stimuli and disabilities, free-
doms and servitudes, that industry can truly be said to make the men and
women who work in it, no less truly than the commodities it turns out for the
market.
J. CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS 46-47 (1926).
43. J. COMMONS, supra note 13, at 328-29. One function of law is to provide induce-
ments and restrictions on scarce resources to advance the public good. Legislative enact-
ments are concerned with the long-term good of society, not necessarily the myopic goals
and interests of individuals and employers. Professor John R. Commons, in his classic
work THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM, stated the proposition as:
The public is not any particular individual, it is a classification of activities in
the body politic deemed to be of value to the rest of the public, rather than a
classification of individuals. ...
This [public purpose] is the process of classification and reclassification ac-
cording to the purposes of the ruling authorities, a process which has advanced
with every change in economic evolution and every change in feelings and habits
towards human beings, and which is but the proportioning and reproportioning
of inducements to willing and unwilling persons, according to what is believed to
be the degree of desired reciprocity between them. For classification is the selec-
tion of a certain factor, deemed to be a limiting factor, and enlarging the field of
that factor by restraining the field of other limiting factors, in order to accom-
plish what is deemed to be the largest total result from all. . . .Thus, when the
hoped-for welfare of women or children comes to be believed to be a limiting
factor in the national economy, their hours of labor are reduced or their mini-
mum wages raised, by imposing new duties on employers or parents, under the
belief that merely this new apportionment of freedom or collective power, re-
gardless of other changes in the quantity of labor, or of national resources, or of
individual efficiency, will increase the national welfare. So with all other legisla-
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private ordering mechanism, private activities deemed to be of
benefit to the public at large are encouraged. Not all private ac-
tivities are given blanket approval. The public infrastructure
provides inducement to private wealth producers "according to
beliefs in the public value, with the intention of reapportioning
the national economy and thus enlarging the commonwealth.""
What is of "value" to the public necessarily includes many
poorly defined intangible interests, and often requires the ac-
commodation of equally supportable but inherently conflicting
interests. Such interests include individual liberty and freedom,
private property rights, the role of institutions, and economic
and social status.45 A proper decision methodology, adopting the
balancing of interests perspective, must be broad based.
To draw a contrast to the methodology embraced by the Law
and Economics proponents, who draw from the neoclassical
economists, one might examine another methodology-that of
the institutional economists. 4" The institutionalist methodology
focuses "upon a holistic and evolutionary view of the structure-
behavior-performance of the economy. . . in a system of general
interdependence or cumulative causation.' 47 Embracing the in-
stitutional methodology mitigates problems of self-validated
universal truths, linearity, and simplistic modeling. Using the fa-
miliar case study approach, institutionalists seek to construct a
tive and judicial decisions which determine Freedom in one direction by impos-
ing liability in the opposite direction ...
It is often charged against legislation that the state does not create
wealth-only private activity is wealth-producing. The charge is, of course, true.
Legislation only classifies activities and proportions the inducements to wealth-
producers. Individuals do the rest. . . .But they may waste the commonwealth
by bad proportioning, may enlarge it by good proportioning.
J. COMMONS, supra note 13, at 328-30.
44. Id. at 329.
45. The tension between defensible positions is inherent in legal decision taking the
form of common-place balancing tests. Consistency and adherence to precedent, how-
ever, must be tempered with the recognition of a dynamic system evolving into more
complex institutional structures and integrated markets. Nevertheless, failure to act in a
given area is not without consequences. The difficulty in choosing which classification of
activities enlarges the public good is readily apparent. The default or silence position in
collective bargaining interpretation as.well as the areas of employee discipline and test-
ing are just such complex issues couched in industrial custom. Conceptually, the underly-
ing conflict between "management rights" and "individual rights" suggests an examina-
tion of the 'balance' between these conflicting interests drawn from industrial custom,
common law, and the policy of the NLRA. See Zimarowski, Interpreting Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements: Silence, Ambiguity and NLRA Section 8(d), 10 INDus. REL. L.J. 465
(1989).
46. See Dugger, supra note 34; Grossack & Loescher, Institutional and Mainstream
Economics: Choice and Power as the Basis for a Synthesis, 14 J. ECON. ISSUES 925
(1980); Wilber & Harrison, supra note 37.
47. Wilber & Harrison, supra note 37, at 73.
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pattern model, in contrast to the predictive model, which draws
from a basis of facts rather than unassailable universal truths. In
contrast to the neoclassical economists to whom prediction obvi-
ated the need for explanation, the institutionalists view under-
standing through pattern models as resulting in explanation.4
48. See Radzicki, On Extending the Institutionalist Paradigm: The Appropriate
Place for System Dynamics within the Economics Profession, 1 Proc. of the 1986 INT'L
CONFERENCE OF THE Sys. DYNAMICS Soc'Y 465 (1986).
Professor Radzicki has taken a methodological argument to bridge the gap between
economics and the analytical techniques involved in system dynamics. A similar bridging
is necessary in law and economics. In this endeavor, he offers the following comparison:
Footnote Table I
A Head-to-Head Comparison of Neoclassical and Institutional
Methodology
Neoclassical
1. A common, objective model of
explanation unites all
Science in all disciplines.
2. Seek to construct predictive
(hierarchical) models or
theories.
3. Hallmark of model or theory
predictive realism obtained
from a highly simplified
structure
4. Basis of predictive model is
laws.





7. Psychological perspective is
subjectivism or
methodological individualism.
8. Individual preferences are
determined by a man's
personal utility function.
9. Individual behavior is pre-
dicted, i.e., explained,
when it is deduced from
basic postulates and initial
conditions. There are thus
Institutionalism
1. A common model of
explanation unites
all institututionalists
but not necessarily with
other scientific disciplines.
2. Seek to construct pattern
(concatenated) models or
theories.
3. Hallmark of model or
theory is understanding
which is facilitated by
descriptive realism in
its structure or pattern.









are molded by the
institutions in which a
man lives, works and
plays
9. Individual behavior is
understood, i.e.,
explained, when it is
documented and shown to
fit into an institutional
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The use of institutionalist models results not in prediction,
but in understanding. From understanding, policymakers can
explain societal interactions and select working rules to achieve
elusive public policy goals. "9 Thus, the richness of the system is
reflected in the case study or pattern-modeling methodology. In-
stitutionalist methodology focuses on causation, power, and con-
preconceived assumptions
about behavior




Emphasis is on statistical
correlation.
11. View is atomistic and static
with analyses based on
timeless universal laws.
12. An ideal typology is formed
from a logical structure




13. The construction of pre-
dictive model begins with
general theoretical laws of
general theoretical laws of
human behavior.
structure of behavioral
norms. There are thus no
preconceived assumptions
about behavior






Emphasis is on causation.











economic systems are the
end result of the
institutionalist method.
Id. at 494-95. As argued throughout this Article, because the legal system cannot ignore
causation, power, conflict and a description and understanding of the relationships, the
institutionalist methodology is to be preferred as it closely parallels the case study meth-
odology used in legal analysis.
49. The working rules create both rights and duties enforceable and protected in the
public or private ordered dispute resolution forums. Drawing from the writings of Pro-
fessor Commons:
There is no right [liberty] without its corresponding duty, no effective or actual
right-and-duty of individuals without both a correlative power and responsibility
of officials to come to the aid of the right by enforcing the duty. Every right has
two corresponding duties, the duty of the opposite person and the duty of offi-
cials to exercise the collective power upon that person. For, not only is there no
right if there is no remedy but there is no -emedy if there is no power to hold
officials responsible. The violation of a positive right brings into existence at
once, by "operation of law," a remedial "right of action" which is none else than
the official duty of courts and executives to enforce the right.
J. COMMONS, supra note 13, at 363-64; see also the legal scholarship cited by Professor
Commons, id. at 91 n.1. The standardization of expectations in organized society is
achieved by the protection of rights and duties.
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flict. The neoclassical methodology focuses on statistical signifi-
cance. Identifying and understanding the broad factual bases of
the pattern models in labor law is a complex task.50
The creation of pattern models begins with a description of
the relationship among societal members drawn from case stud-
ies and participant observations.51 In every conflict situation
there are unequal distributions of physical, moral, and economic
power. Individuals act through institutions which focus and di-
rect the usage of power. The scope and uses of power are influ-
enced by the nature of the institutions, and the manifestations
of public policy in the form of legal and customary working rules
and designated status. A common unit of comparative analysis
between institutions exercising power is the "transaction."52 The
commonplace notion of bargaining transactions posits an arms-
length transaction between two parties deemed equals before the
law. Bargaining transactions enlarge the public good through the
transfer of wealth by agreements arrived at through persuasion
or coercion.53
Professor Commons argues that the simple bargaining trans-
action model, myopically embraced by the Law and Economics
proponents, does not describe the more complex interactions
among societal members.5 Commons has modeled two addi-
tional transaction constructs: managerial transactions and ra-
tioning transactions. The "managerial transactions" are con-
cerned with the production of wealth through the creation of
command-obedience relationships. The law recognizes one party
as a legal superior to the other, within certain limits, generally
established by common law, statutes, or constitutions.5 5 Thus,
the "rules" pertaining to the employment relationship, agency
concepts, and fundamental organization law are created. The
"rationing transaction" posits a relationship between legal
50. The writings of Professor Commons on power and transactions in the social order
provide conceptual insight into the description necessary in the pattern models. See J.
COMMONS, supra note 13, at 65-142; J. COMMONS, supra note 42, at 13-124; and Com-
mons, The Problem of Correlating Law, Economics, and Ethics, 8 Wisc. L. REv. 3, 5-12
(1932) [hereinafter Commons, Law, Economics, and Ethics].
51. See Wilber & Harrison, supra note 37. The early writings of Professor Commons,
cited extensively throughout this article, contributed significant theoretical and practical
insights to societal relationships. See J. COMMONS, supra note 13; J. COMMONS, supra note
42.
52. See supra note 50.
53. See J. COMMONS, supra note 42, at 59-64; Commons, Law, Economics, and Ethics,
supra note 50, at 5-9.
54. See supra note 50.
55. See J. COMMONS, supra note 42, at 64-67; Commons, Law, Economics, and Ethics,
supra note 50, at 9-11.
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superiors and legal inferiors which apportion wealth and
power.56 These complex transactions are, of course, interdepen-
dent. The regulated organizations and the hybrid systems of
quasi-private ordering fall within these two areas.
The analysis of the complex structure of underlying manage-
rial transactions illustrates that the NLRA is much more than a
set of economic bargaining transactions, as assumed by the Law
and Economics proponents. As physical, economic, and moral
power are the currencies that form the bases of bargaining, man-
agerial, and rationing transactions, it is instructive to describe
power in the context of labor-management relationships. The re-
mainder of this Article adopts the institutionalist methodology
and applies it to an analysis of the NLRA.
B. Power Balancing and the NLRA
The NLRA57 recognized the broad-based.importance of em-
ployment and employment stability to the individual. It also
recognized that conflicts between competing employer-employee
interests are inevitable, and can lead to disruptions in com-
merce. The legislation gave approval to the collective bargaining
process in recognition of the need to redress the pervasive power
imbalance between employers and employees, and the need to
provide a dispute resolution forum.58 One goal of the NLRA was
to channel economic conflict; however, as discussed above, em-
ployment has a greater significance than mere economic reward.
The Act and earlier courts recognized a second, dependent area
of employer-employee conflict-Commons' managerial transac-
tions, the command-obedience power relationship. 5
The modification of the command-obedience power relation-
ship is often classified under such terms as "industrial democ-
56. See J. COMMONS, supra note 42, at 67-69; Commons, Law, Economics, and Ethics,
supra note 50, at 11-12.
57. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
58. See supra note 6.
59. See J. COMMONS, supra note 42, at 64-67; Commons, Law, Economics & Ethics,
supra note 50, at 9-11. Managerial transactions appear in the formation of employment
relationships. In a conceptually fascinating area, private authoritarian organizations,
aided by the power of the legal order, are given the ability to command and discipline
legally designated inferiors. At the same time, until the erosion of the employment-at-
will doctrine, the inferior had little or no rights in the employment. See J. COMMONS,
supra note 13, at 283-312; Commons, The Right to Work, 21 THE ARENA 131 (1899). In
the creation of command-and-obedience relationships the social order strikes a balance
between liberty interests and property interests.
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racy" or "industrial due process.''6 This classification follows
from the view that the democratic principle upon which the na-
tion was founded should not be limited to the political arena,
but should extend to the industrial arena. Decisions and value
systems imposed in the workplace may be more important to the
worker than decisions in legislative halls, and as such,
"[diemocratic principles demand that workers have a voice in
the decisions that control their lives; human dignity requires
that workers not be subject to oppressive conditions or arbitrary
actions.""1 The conflict between industrial democracy and the
authoritarian institutional structure of industrial organizations
as represented by the traditional command-obedience relation-
ship between employer-employee, is readily apparent. Yet the
actual breadth and scope of commitment to the ideal of indus-
trial due process through the collective bargaining forum are
subject to infrequent debate.62
The power balancing function of the NLRA is theoretically
designed to mitigate disruptions in interstate commerce and fa-
cilitate the growth of industrial democracy. The power function
can be viewed as further limiting particular aspects of economic
coercion. The power function also has significant spillover effects
60. See M. DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1865-1965, (1970);
Summers, Industrial Democracy: America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29
(1979) [hereinafter Summers, Industrial Democracy]; Summers, Individual Protection
Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976) [hereinafter
Summers, Individual Protection]; see also Summers, supra note 3; Weiler, Promises to
Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1769 (1983).
61. Summers, Industrial Democracy, supra note 60, at 29.
62. In WHAT Do UNIONS Do?, R. Freemen & J. Medoff augmented the traditional
economic perspective on labor unions with an "exit-voice" perspective. Freeman and
Medoff's study attempted to integrate economic studies with behavioral concepts. The
study, considered one of the most significant contributions to the industrial relations
literature, spawned numerous symposiums and critiques. It challenges the position that
unions do not add to the economy, but only take from it; therefore, it is in the public
interest to limit union power. Professors Freeman and Medoff, however, raise an "exit-
voice" face paralleling the concerns of industrial democracy. After summarizing a broad
database, they conclude that, on the whole, unions contribute more positive aspects than
negative to industrial relations. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 3 at 3-25, 94-110.
See also Marshall, supra note 3; Summers, supra note 3. Nevertheless, the concept of
industrial democracy provides the intellectual basis for restructuring the command-obe-
dience relationship in statutory as well as common law evolution. This restructuring is
exemplified by the erosion of the employment-at-will concept and the numerous statutes
addressing employee health and safety, privacy, information access, pensions, etc. More-
over, this restructuring represents a recognition of the dynamic and evolutionary nature
of our social order. The evolution to more complex and integrated markets as well as
concentrations of economic power in private organizations, many exceeding the GNP of
some nation states, suggests the need to reexamine many old command-obedience rela-
tionship rules constructed for less complex institutions and markets.
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on the custom and common-law based command-obedience rela-
tionships. Conceptually, power can be viewed as a calculus of
compliance vis-a-vis noncompliance,63 or:
Costs to B of noncompliance (or
Power of A -disagreement) 
with A's terms
Costs to B of compliance (or
agreement) with A's terms.
A's power will increase as B's cost of noncompliance increases
or, conversely, as B's cost of compliance decreases. The costs can
be either real or perceived and encompass both tangible and in-
tangible concerns. Thus, the expression is not readily quantifi-
able and is broader in scope than mere economic utilitarianism.
Moreover, power is always against some obstacle; it does not op-
erate in a vacuum. Power, then, concedes nothing without a de-
mand backed by countervailing power. 4 Thus, to complete the
expression:
Costs to A of noncompliance (or
Power of B -disagreement) 
with B's terms
Costs to B of compliance (or
agreement) with B's terms.
Generalizing, it is apparent that a party's power to impose sig-
nificant costs of noncompliance on its opposition is directly re-
lated to its success at the bargaining table, the shop floor, or a
public arena. The costs of noncompliance or power exercises in
the multiple transactions operating under the NLRA, however,
are not treated equally.
II. THE SECOND TIER: SUBSTANTIVE PRIVATE ORDERING AND
THE POWER CONTEXT
The balancing process enhances or constrains a party's inter-
est by controlling power-the ability to impose a cost of non-
compliance upon its opponent. As argued earlier, these power
63. See N. CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 213-38 (1951); see also Leap &
Grigsby, A Conceptualization of Collective Bargaining Power, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 202 (1986).
64. See supra note 1.
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exercises embrace noneconomic as well as economic based fac-
tors and policy concerns. Simply inventorying the power exer-
cises is, however, not enough. It should be recognized that the
power exercises are not absolute, but are situational and dy-
namic. 5 Power exercises produce actual and/or perceived costs
of noncompliance-results or impacts.
Table I summarizes the sources of power in the labor and em-
ployer arsenals. Recognizing that employers and labor are not
always in compliance with legal or ethical commands, Table I



















































65. See generally Bacharach & Lawler, Power and Tactics in Bargaining, 34 INDUS.
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pretation: waiver of rights/ access
default positions
-mandatory-permissive barg- -unfair employer
aining distinction: notice practices
and information control
-primary - secondary distinctions
-unfair union practices
The availability and significance of a legal remedy obviously
has practical impact on the cost calculations and deterrent ef-
fects of specific employer-union power exercises. Additionally, it
is a significant influence on the tactical selection of power
sources to achieve the institutional interests of the parties. Ra-
tionally, however, the parties will tactically choose exercises of
power in contravention of the Act's remedial structure if the
perceived burdens, factoring in economic costs, the value of de-
lay, and the burden of legal process, are outweighed by the per-
ceived benefits to the institution.6 Whether created through ju-
dicial construction or the economic environment, a party will
exploit to its tactical advantage a perceived power constraint or
weakness of an opponent. If a specific power exercise is denied, a
party will shift to another power exercise, albeit perhaps a less
timely and effective one, to achieve similar results and impacts.
Power sources, whether from bargaining, managerial, or ration-
ing transactions, are tactically mixed to produce impacts in fur-
therance of a party's interests. The disagreement or noncompli-
ance with a party's demands has an appreciable and
multidimensional cost aspect inducing a movement of position. 7
It is therefore instructive to view controls on power exercises in
the context of NLRA construction and policy.
66. See Summers, supra note 3, at 17.
67. Footnote Table II presents a generalized, non-linked (to specific power sources),
representation of the basic costs that may be imposed upon a party through the exercise
of power. Costs, like the power sources that generate them, are situational and dynamic.
Their scope and effectiveness are linked and dependent upon both power sources and
other legal and environmental mitigating factors. It should be noted that a cost to one
party can be a benefit to the other. For example, the destruction of the union can be
viewed as a cost to labor but as a benefit, indeed a desired outcome, for the employer.
Table II, therefore, represents costs imposed upon a party from that party's perspective.
As such, many of the costs, if taken to extreme, are repugnant to the articulated policies
of the Act. Sources of power, however, are situational and dynamic with impacts or costs
varying over time and intensity by the presence or absence of mitigating factors. Table
III adds a contextual dimension to enhance understanding of the balancing perspective
by representing potential internal and external mitigation factors.
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A. Power Exercises in the Bargaining Context
Section 8(d) of the NLRA channels "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment" through the collective
Footnote Table II
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4. Remedies imposed under law
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bargaining dispute resolution process.6 8 The Court, in its semi-
nal Borg-Warner decision, created a distinction between
mandatory bargaining items channeled through the collective
bargaining process, and permissive bargaining items left to the
unilateral discretion of the parties. 9 Conceptually, such distinc-
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68. See also supra note 10.
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-labor skill level required
-management style and
competence: production layout
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planning and forecasts;
working conditions






69. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. 158(d) 1982. NLRB v. Wooster
Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) [hereinafter Borg-Warner]. Section 8(d)
could be viewed as an articulation and expansion of existing labor law policy, but every
statute can be read broadly or narrowly. Section 8(d) specifies good faith bargaining with
respect to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . or any
question arising thereunder." There are two ways such language could be interpreted.
First, as Justice Harlan's dissent in Borg-Warner forcefully argues, the language may be
interpreted as merely descriptive of substantive matters open to discussion by the par-
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tions could be viewed as protecting both parties from an uncon-
scionable exercise of power interfering with wholly organiza-
tional issues.70 But the Board and the courts rejected the
potentially narrow categorization provided by the unconsciona-
bleness concept, in favor of a broader permissive category drawn
from both the traditional control of capital and the command-
obedience relationship, thereby excluding a broader range of is-
sues from the mandatory reach of the collective bargaining
process.
71
As sections 8(d), 8(a)(5), and 8(b)(3) only require good faith
bargaining and not agreement, such broad distinctions seem un-
necessary under the Act. 72 Moreover, because it is a violation of
the duty to bargain in good faith to take a conflict over a per-
missive issue to impasse, 73 the mandatory-permissive dichotomy
not only defines the substance of bargaining, but enforces its de-
termination by denying the use of power to induce not only
agreement but even discussion to impasse under penalty of
Board sanction.7'
ties. Justice Harlan based his analysis upon the legislative history and policy of section
8(d), and recognizing the preemptive impact of a mandatory-permissive bargaining clas-
sification, argued that the "Board possessed no statutory authority to regulate the sub-
stantive scope of the bargaining process insofar as lawful demands of the parties were
concerned." Id. at 354 (Harlan, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original). The dissent argued
that the policies of the Act demanded a retention of the legal-illegal distinction in bar-
gaining items.
The second manner in which to view the language of section 8(d) is as words of limita-
tion. Thus the majority in Borg-Warner held:
[t]hese provisions establish the obligation of the employer and the representa-
tive of its employees to bargain with each other in good faith with respect to
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment .... " The duty
is limited to those subjects, and within that area neither party is legally obli-
gated to yield. . . . As to other matters, however, each party is free to bargain or
not to bargain, and to agree or not to agree.
Id. at 349 (citation omitted). With this approach, the Borg-Warner Court created the
poorly defined demarcation between mandatory and permissive bargaining items.
70. This was one rationale for the Borg-Warner decision. Id. at 349-50.
71. See supra note 18.
72. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
73. Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157 (1971).
74. Id.; see also NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962) (holding that a refusal to
negotiate in fact of subject within § 8(d) is an unfair labor practice).
Placed in its practical context, a strong argument can be made that powerful employ-
ers and powerful unions can link mandatory and permissive bargaining issues, backed by
costs of noncompliance, and thereby negate the impact of the dichotomy at least at the
bargaining table. Weak unions and weak employers, it can be argued, cannot achieve
satisfactory accommodation on mandatory items let alone permissive items. As such, the
classifications are not as important as the bargaining power and the willingness to inflict
a cost of noncompliance that a party possesses. The argument has a Darwinesque appeal
but ignores the mediating effects of the collective bargaining process in easing the under-
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The distinction has a significant practical effect both in the
negotiation stage and during the term of the agreement. Items
deemed permissive by the Board require no good faith bargain-
ing to impasse prior to unilateral action, nor is notice and infor-
mation access, one basis of productive relationships, readily
available. 5 The notice and information distinctions between
mandatory and permissive items should not be discounted
lightly. Control over information and notice are significant
weapons. By controlling information and timely notice a party
can effectively preempt a significant and perhaps costly response
from its opposition.78 The current Board has made significant
distinctions between information access and notice require-
ments, based on the mandatory-permissive distinctions, with
case trends suggesting a restrictive approach to information ac-
cess on permissive items.7
current of unredressed conflict. This argument ignores the position of weaker unions and
weaker employers.
Historically, one function of law is to protect the weaker from improper exercises of
power from the stronger. Weaker unions and weaker employers are denied access to the
Board processes and are subject to arguably improper exercises of economic coercion
undermining the mediating effects of the collective bargaining process. The ability to
exploit the dichotomy will encourage the practice of deception in articulating issues. But
see First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-79 (1981):
The concept of mandatory bargaining is premised on the belief that collective
discussions backed by the parties' economic weapons will result in decisions that
are better for both management and labor and for society as a whole. This will
be true, however, only if the subject proposed for discussion is amenable to reso-
lution through the bargaining process. Management must be free from the con-
straints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a
profitable business.
Id. at 678-79 (footnotes and citations omitted). Cf. J. ATLESON, supra note 20, at 111-35;
Litvin, supra note 20.
The issue of which collective bargaining clauses are permissive and which are
mandatory is unsettled. Distinctions have been made on decision directed clauses (con-
straining the decision making process before unilateral final decision) vis-A-vis effects
directed clauses (constraining the decision implementation after unilateral final deci-
sion). See Zimarowski, Employer Evasion of the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Pol-
icy Directions and the Reagan NLRB, 37 LAB. L.J. 50 (1986); see also Lone Star Steel
Co. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981).
75. See, e.g., Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
76. To be meaningful, the notice must be given sufficiently in advance of any unilat-
eral action. Notice, however, is power, and by controlling or limiting notice a party can
foreclose an opponent from preparing an adequate response or from marshaling other
forces for retaliation. Thus, it is in the interests of a party to attempt to limit notice to
improve one's bargaining position and power. Such attempts to limit notice are inappo-
site to the policy of the Act, but, without the incentive of swift and adequate remedy, a
party will maximize its individual power and position through limited notice and infor-
mation access.
77. See, e.g., Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. at 894. See generally Kohler, Distinc-
tions Without Differences: Effects Bargaining In Light of First National Maintenance, 5
INDUs. REL. L.J. 402, 408-10 (1983); Zimarowski, supra note 74, at 55-59.
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The mandatory-permissive dichotomy would be nothing more
than an interesting anomaly in the law if not for the fact that a
significant employer's cost of noncompliance has been defined as
largely a permissive issue. A potent source of employer costs of
noncompliance is the control over unit work.7 s If such exercises
of employer power are outside the mediating effects of the col-
lective bargaining process, a structural imbalance of power is
created whereby labor costs of noncompliance are channeled
through the process, but employer power is left virtually un-
checked. The result is a preemptive determination of substance
by court and Board fiat, potentially rendering the collective bar-
gaining process a shallow ritual devoid of major areas of em-
ployee concern and signaling the return to unchanneled eco-
nomic coercion.
Contract language and interpretation issues are also rising in
importance as employer-exercised power attempts to define and
exploit the mandatory-permissive dichotomy. The Board's and
courts' roles as substantive facilitators of the collective bargain-
ing process expand beyond the mandatory-permissive preemp-
tive determination to include the interpretation of specific con-
tract language in the agreement as it relates to the contractual
waiver of power exercises.79 The Board, approaching an almost
literalist interpretation of the rights and duties of the parties
78. The control over unit work, inclusive of subcontracting, automation, consolida-
tion, relocation, and closure, is a significant source of employer power. See supra Table I
at 68. When exercised, this power obviously affects employees' expectations in continued
employment. The union's strike weapon and its derivatives in slowdowns, soldiering, low
productivity, and poor quality control restructure the relationship, and affect to some
degree the contractual expectations of the employer. From a contract perspective, a cen-
tral question in accommodating collective agreements with NLRA policy is whether par-
ticular unilateral actions constitute a "breach" of an agreement and what should be the
appropriate remedy. See Summers, supra note 8, at 537-48. Most of the above unilateral
employee responses are subject to the employer's "industrial common law" remedies of
discipline or discharge if the particular activity is outside the ambit of section 7. See
Feller, supra note 8, at 774-804; Finkin, Labor Law at Boz-A Theory of Meyers Indus-
tries, Inc. Sears, Roebuck & Co. and Bird Engineering, 71 IOWA L. REV. 155 (1985); see
also F. ELKOURI & E. ELKouRI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 650-707 (4th ed. 1985); infra
notes 103-49.
79. The Act does not include the violation of contract terms as an unfair labor prac-
tice. An earlier version of the senate bill contained a § 8(a)(6) provision making it an
unfair labor practice "to violate the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement or the
terms of an agreement to submit a labor dispute to arbitration." S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 13, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS ACT, 1947 111 (1948). A § 8(b)(5) contained a similar provision applicable to labor
organizations. Both provision, were struck from the final Act. Id. at 109-11, 114. This
does not imply that the Board and the courts are precluded from examining contract
language, only that such inquiries are dependent upon unfair labor practice provisions or
contract enforcement through § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). See supra -note 8.
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under the agreement, looks for express language in the collective
bargaining agreement, to determine unfair labor practice and
8(d) issues.8 The courts, approaching similar interpretation is-
sues through appellate review and enforcement of arbitration
awards, through section 301,81 ensure that an arbitration deci-
sion draws its "essence" from the collective bargaining agree-
ment.82
Whether from the direction of unfair labor practices or the
arbitration process, both sets of issues focus upon the rights of a
party to unilaterally exercise power and restructure the collec-
tive bargaining relationship.83 Each tribunal initially examines
the collective bargaining agreement for applicable contract lan-
guage and, if language is found, defines the scope of the lan-
guage. This process raises an equally significant but more subtle
determination. With the structural power imbalance resulting
from the mandatory-permissive bargaining item dichotomy and
the limitations on effective union power responses,84 express lan-
guage restricting significant power exercises, within this permis-
sive classification, is becoming increasingly difficult to negotiate.
Thus, the tribunals are required to address the impact of silence
and ambiguity, a "default position," in contract interpretation.85
In an ongoing bargaining relationship, the party who com-
mands the default position is in a superior bargaining posture.
80. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967) (Board can interpret con-
tract language if necessary to determine unfair labor practices).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
82. See supra note 8.
83. See infra note 85. If the Board's decision and an arbitrator's decision conflict, the
arbitrator's decision must give way. International Longshoremen's and Warehouseman's
Union, Local 32 v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 773 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding an
unfair labor practice where an attempt to circumvent the Board's processes through arbi-
tration proceedings occurred), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986). Certain contract viola-
tions are also violative of the NLRA. In processing unfair labor practice charges which
also constitute contract violations, the Board's established policy is to suspend its pro-
ceedings to permit the claim to be put before an arbitration tribunal. United Technolo-
gies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1979); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). If
the party filing the charge is dissatisfied with the resulting arbitration award, it may
petition the Board for review to determine if deferral to the arbitration award or reacti-
vation of the unfair labor practice claim is warranted. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573
(1984); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). The Board's deferral policy is con-
troversial. See Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the Board
cannot defer away its statutory obligation to protect statutory rights). See generally
Peck, A Proposal to End NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process, 60 WASH. L. REV.
355 (1985).
84. See supra note 9.
85. See generally Farnsworth, Disputes over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 860 (1968).
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In this context, a party can prevail on a particular issue by in-
clusion of language favorable to its interests, and more impor-
tantly, by saying nothing or keeping negative language out. All
institutions need operating rules, and bargaining over each and
every rule would prove to be inefficient and would result in
lengthy documents still incomplete as to every contingency."8 As
such, it would be impossible to develop interpretation rules ap-
plicable to every confrontation in a complex labor-management
relationship. Therefore, the inquiry must be sufficiently nar-
rowed to embrace the significant issues of frustration or forfei-
ture of the underlying contractual expectations of the parties to
the collective bargaining agreement.87
86. In the commercial transaction area the default or silence position is partially set-
tled through the use of statutory provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code (1987).
See, e.g., U.C.C., Art. 2 (1987) (Sales). The U.C.C. also recognizes the complexity of
terms during the contract formation stage in the so-called battle of the forms provision.
U.C.C. § 2-207 and official comments (1978); see also C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan Int'l Co.,
552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977); supra note 13.
87. The concurring opinion by Justice Stewart in Fibreboard Paper Prod. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203 (1964), addressed the issue of frustration of the agreement by the subcon-
tracting of unit work:
Analytically, this case is not far from that which would be presented if the
employer had merely discharged all its employees and replaced them with other
workers willing to work on the same job in the same plant without the various
fringe benefits so costly to the company. While such a situation might well be
considered a § 8(a)(3) violation upon a finding that the employer discriminated
against the discharged employees because of their union affiliation, it would be
equally possible to regard the employer's action as a unilateral act frustrating
negotiation on the underlying questions of work scheduling and remuneration,
and so an evasion of its duty to bargain on these questions, which are concededly
subject to compulsory collective bargaining . . . . Insofar as the employer frus-
trated collective bargaining with respect to these concededly bargaining issues
by its unilateral act of subcontracting this work, it can properly be found to have
violated its statutory duty under § 8(a)(5).
379 U.S. at 224-25 (Stewart, J. concurring) (footnote omitted).
Employers' interests surface prominently in the Court's decision in First Nat'l Mainte-
nance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981):
The concept of mandatory bargaining is premised on the belief that collective
discussions backed by the parties' economic weapons will result in decisions that
are better for both management and labor and for society as a whole. This will
be true, however, only if the subject proposed for discussion is amenable to reso-
lution through the bargaining process. Management must be free from the con-
straints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a
profitable business. It also must have some degree of certainty beforehand as to
when it may proceed to reach decisions without fear of later evaluations labeling
its conduct an unfair labor practice. . . . Nonetheless, in view of an employer's
need for unencumbered decisionmaking, bargaining over management decisions
that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment
should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the
collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the
business.
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The command of the default position clearly affects the bar-
gaining posture of the parties. The Board and court approaches
to contract language invariably contain views as to the nature of
the duties created between the parties in the collective bargain-
ing "contract" and the relationship between employers and em-
ployees. The interpretations and case results often turn upon an
unspoken conflict between the management reserved or residual
rights theory,"" where management retains what it does not liter-
ally relinquish in bargaining drawing from traditional autocratic
control of capital and the command-obedience 9 relationships
and the implied obligations theory. 0
The reading of management rights and no strike clauses fo-
cuses the conflict between management reserved rights theory
and the implied obligations theory. The current Board and court
approach seems to be overly rigid, suggesting a double standard
of contract reading. When addressing the union's cost of non-
452 U.S. at 678-79 (footnotes and citations omitted). There are numerous critiques of the
Court's purported balancing of interests, including a sharp dissent by Justice Brennan,
452 U.S. at 688-91; see also Litvin, supra note 20.
Employees also have interests and expectations in the employment relationship. Con-
sider the Board's statement in Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966):
It is equally true, however, and ought not to be lost sight of, that an employer's
decision to make a "major" change in the nature of his business, such as the
termination of a portion thereof, is also of significance for those employees
whose jobs will be lost by the termination. For, just as the employer has invested
capital in the business, so the employee has invested years of his working life,
accumulating seniority, accruing pension rights, and developing skills that may
or may not be salable to another employer. And, just as the employer's interest
in the protection of his capital investment is entitled to consideration in our
interpretation of the Act, so too is the employee's interest in the protection of
his livelihood ...
The objectives of national labor policy, reflected in established princi-
ples of federal law, require that the rightful prerogative of owners inde-
pendently to arrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as
employers be balanced by some protection to the employees from a sud-
den change in the employment relationship.
161 N.L.R.B. at 566-67 (quoting Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964)).
The unilateral actions of employers and labor are often defended or prompted by
"outside" events changing the circumstances under which the original agreement was
consummated.
88. See Killingsworth, The Presidential Address: Management Rights Revisited, 22
PROC. ANN. MTG. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. (1970); see also infra note 97.
89. See J. COMMONS, supra note 42, at 64-67; Commons, Law, Economics & Ethics,
supra note 50, at 9-11; see also supra note 62. See generally J. COMMONS, supra note 13,
at 283-312; Commons, supra note 59.
90. According to implied obligations theory, an agreement, taken as a whole, creates
specific contractual as well as derivative implied rights that can not be frustrated by the
unilateral actions of one party. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 78, at
457-585; P. PRASLOW & E. PETERS, ARBITRATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CONFLICT
RESOLUTION IN LABOR RELATIONS 43-46 (2d ed. 1983).
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compliance, contract clauses and waiver of rights are read
broadly with a default toward restriction of the cost of noncom-
pliance.91 When addressing the restriction of management pre-
rogatives, such clauses are read narrowly with a default toward
granting management the right at issue.9 ' This observation be-
lies arguments by employers that the NLRA unduly restricts
their activities. Such an approach does not provide the proper
accommodation necessary to do "justice between the employer,
the union, and the employees, aid in the continuing relations of
the parties, promote the statutory purposes of collective bar-
gaining, and protect the social interest in labor peace.
' 93
If employers can walk away from negotiated contract terms
without penalty, the collective bargaining agreement is but a
cruel, empty promise. Silence and ambiguity of terms should be
resolved to avoid contractual forfeiture. Simply put, why would
any party willingly seek a contractual agreement that is binding
only upon themselves? To do justice between labor unions and
the employer, and to further the public good, dispute resolution
forums must view the collective bargaining contract as a "spe-
cial" contract negotiated in a power confrontation context.
Achievement of the NLRA policies are better evaluated in terms
of channeling costs of noncompliance through the process of col-
lective bargaining.
If a collective bargaining agreement can be avoided by em-
ployers as a matter of legal construction, the very existence of
the labor union as a vehicle of industrial democracy is called
into question. If the labor organization has no real power to ef-
fect changes in the workplace and protect the security interests
of the employees, union membership becomes a poor return. Ad-
ditionally, labor unions lose their ability to control their mem-
bership. At both the union and nonunion level, the intangible
concepts of loyalty, confidentiality, pride in workmanship, job
satisfaction, and organizational justice are subsumed to a harsh,
91. See, e.g., Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1715 (1985), rev'd and
remanded, 797 F.2d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Cf. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
803 v. NLRB, 826 F.2d 1283 (3d Cir. 1987). The reading of no strike clauses focuses the
problem of restraining labor's primary cost of disagreement. The Board has been incon-
sistent and the circuits are split. See also United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d
772 (7th Cir. 1983); Cedar Coal Co. v. UMWA, 560 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1977).
92. See, e.g., Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co. (II), 268 N.L.R.B. 601
(1984), aff'd on other grounds, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Cf. Los Angeles Marine
Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979). See
generally Zimarowski, supra note 45.
93. Summers, supra note 8, at 544.
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authoritarian, economic calculus. " A return to labor militancy or
a hostile, subservient workforce may therefore become common-
place.95 The Board's and the courts' balancing of interests pro-
cess is skewed in favor of the employer-not as a matter of stat-
utory command but as a matter of judicial construction.
B. Employer's Discipline and Discharge Power
Employers have other potent sources of judicially protected
power in addition to the control over unit work. The authorita-
rian organizational structure, coupled with extensive economic
power, allows employers to impose costs of noncompliance upon
employees to deter the exercise of job-related and nonjob-re-
lated activities.98 The "costs" imposed include various aspects of
employee discipline and discharge. The power of discipline and
discharge, drawn from outdated notions of at-will-employment
97
in the traditional command-obedience relationship, creates a
fundamental conflict with the granting of section 7 rights and
the NLRA policy of furthering industrial democracy.9
94. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
95. Economic and organizational realities dictate that the power between labor and
management will never be in absolute parity and that employees, even where they are
stockholders, will never be equal partners in the operation of the organization. This does
not mean, however, even absent legislative intervention, that progress toward industrial
democracy and organizational justice cannot achieve a significant measure of success
within the current economic reality.
96. See supra note 42. The concept of "whistleblowers" aptly illustrates that em-
ployer exercised power can be to the detriment of public safety, transferring these costs
to society at large.
97. The employment-at-will doctrine is traceable to the writing of a single commenta-
tor. See H. WOOD, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272 (1877). Drawing
from "Wood's Rule" early courts stated it more succinctly: "All may dismiss their em-
ployes at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for cause mor-
ally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong." Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R.,
81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) [emphasis supplied]. For a thorough treatment of the at-
will-employment rule and the evolving theories signaling its demise, see LOPATKA & MAR-
TIN, Developments in the Law of Wrongful Discharge, in LITIGATING WRONGFUL Dis-
CHARGE AND INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIMS (1986); see also Kornblau, Common Law Reme-
dies for Wrongfully Discharged Employees, 9 INDus. REL. L.J. 660 (1987).
98. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982):
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist la-
bor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
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In theory, section 7 restricts the employer's power to disci-
pline and discharge employees who are engaging in "concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection."99 Conversely, the employer's ability to
impose costs of noncompliance on employees is not restricted if
the activity is outside the ambit of section 7 protection. 10 This
leaves open two fundamental questions: what is the scope of sec-
tion 7 rights, and what is the applicable industrial discipline
standard that balances the employer-employee power interests
in furtherance of the policies of the NLRA?
Arguably, absent statutory or common-law restrictions upon
at-will employment, the employer can exploit the command-
obedience relationship and discipline or discharge for "good
cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong."'' Thus,
the NLRA can be read narrowly to preserve the at-will employ-
ment rule and to limit the reach of section 7. But curiously, the
NLRA expressly preserves the employer's prerogative to disci-
pline and discharge using the term "for cause."'0 2 Whether sec-
99. Id. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer - (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) provides: "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discour-
age membership in any labor organization .... "
For an extensive treatment of the "concerted" requirement under section 7, see
Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert" Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286 (1981).
Section 8(a)(1) [29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1)(1982)] is concerned with discriminatory effect;
§ 8(a)(3) [29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982)] is concerned with discriminatory motive. The
motive requirement of § 8(a)(3) presents evidentiary problems particularly in "mixed
motive" discharges (i.e., discharges ostensibly substantiated by proper business ratio-
nales but possessing discriminatory overtones). In NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), the Court adopted the Wright Line analysis requiring a "but
for" assessment of employer's motive, shifting the burden of proof to the employer to
show a legitimate business justification for its conduct. NLRB v. Wright Line, 251
N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989
(1982); see also Comment, Wright Line: The Burden of Proof in Dual Motive Cases
under Section 8(A)(3), 13 CUMa. L. REV. 239 (1982); Note, Labor Law-Mixed Motive
Discharges-An Attempt to Formulate a Consistent Test-NLRB v. Wright Line, 31 U.
KAN. L. REV. 328 (1983). See generally Lieb, Constructive Discharge Under Section
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act: A Study in Undue Concern over Motives, 7
INDUs. REL. L.J. 143 (1985); Oberer, supra note 22.
100. This is the case unless such activity would be in violation of existing law. See,
e.g., Vincent v. Trend Western Technical Corp., 828 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987). See gener-
ally Fick, Protecting Worker Complaints After Meyers Industries, 31 ST. Louis U. L.J.
823 (1987). The possibility of a wrongful discharge action should be considered. See
LOPATKA & MARTIN, supra note 97.
101. See supra note 97.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). Section 10(c) of the NLRA reads in pertinent part:
"No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee
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tion 10(c)'s "for cause" is simply another articulation of the at-
will employment rule or the much narrower concept evolved
from collective bargaining or industrial jurisprudence is an open
question.10 3 Thus, a coordination problem embracing larger is-
sues of redundancy, preemption, and deferral arises.104 Is the
proper balance of employer disciplinary power and NLRA policy
concerns accomplished through sections 7, 8(a)(1), and 8(a)(3);
through a collectively bargained grievance and arbitration proce-
dure; through contract enforcement under section 301; or, in a
curious turn of legal evolution, through state tort and contract
wrongful discharge actions? The inquiry regarding section 7, as
with the mandatory-permissive bargaining item dichotomy, is
the interpretation of this statutory language in the context of
the multiple policy rationales of the NLRA.
Although no clear lines of demarcation exist, actions within
the ambit of section 7's protected rights can be distilled from
case law into a three part analysis. The three threshold elements
are in the conjunctive, and therefore, the failure of any subpart
renders the disciplinary or discharge action outside of section 7
and subject to the unilateral discretion of the employer. The em-
ployee's activities, as a threshold matter, must: (1) be concerted,
(2) be protected, and (3) have a proper objective or purpose.
If viewed along the continuum of individual activity, the
Board's and the courts' treatment of "concerted activity" can be
readily classified into five categories. First, "concerted" activities
within the ambit of section 7 embrace the dictionary definition
of actions involving two or more individuals acting as a group.10 5
Second, less controversial but open to evidentiary problems in
practice, is the concept that "concerted" may include a single
who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such
individual was suspended or discharged for cause."
103. "For cause" or "just cause" in industrial jurisprudence is much narrower than
the traditional statement of the employment-at-will concept. See supra note 97. Al-
though "cause" is a fluid term, it generally sustains a disciplinary action if the action was
not arbitrary (governed by rule), capricious (consistency of application), nor discrimina-
tory (treating like things in a like manner). Moreover, many labor arbitrators implicitly
require the rudiments of procedural due process, progressive discipline, and recognition
of seniority. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 78 at 664-65.
104. Employee protections under state and federal law create a bundle of uncoordi-
nated and often redundant causes of action. Case law at all levels addresses this problem.
See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (redundancy); San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (preemption); Collyer Insulated
Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); Spielberg Mfg. Co. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955) (deferral).
105. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (involving a group of em-
ployees distributing union newsletter); NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9
(1962) (involving an employee walk-out over lack of heat in work area).
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individual acting to induce other individuals to join in a group
action. 06 These two classifications of concerted activity have
generally met with approval by the Board and courts. The re-
maining three classifications embrace the concept of "construc-
tive concerted activities" and have met, with one exception, re-
sistance by the current Board and mixed results in the circuits.
All three classifications involve an individual acting alone to re-
dress a "group" concern.
The third classification embraces an individual protesting a
contractual right grounded in the collective bargaining agree-
ment. This issue was seemingly resolved by a five-to-four Court
decision in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc.0 In City Dis-
posal, the Court gave approval to the Interboro doctrine,' °8
holding that "[a] lone employee's invocation of a right grounded
in his collective bargaining agreement is, therefore, a concerted
activity in a very real sense." ' 9 The employer is precluded from
exercising its disciplinary and discharge power against the indi-
106. See, e.g., Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964) (stating
in dicta that a single employee's action that is found to induce group activity is pro-
tected); Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 467 (1986) (holding that employee discus-
sions with individual employees regarding employer policies to encourage union member-
ship are protected).
107. 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
108. Id. at 829-31. See also Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966),
enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967) (individual's assertion of a right grounded in a
collective-bargaining agreement is concerted activity).
109. 465 U.S. at 832. The rationale in City Disposal turns upon the view that an
individual asserting a collective right of work-related interest is an extension of the
group activity that originally produced that right albeit removed in time and place. Id. at
832-33. Consider the policy rationale articulated by the Court:
[11n enacting section 7 of the NLRA, Congress sought generally to equalize the
bargaining power of the employee with that of his employer by allowing employ-
ees to band together in confronting an employer regarding the terms and condi-
tions of their employment. There is no indication that Congress intended to
limit this protection to situations in which an employee's activity and that of his
fellow employees combine with one another in any particular way. Nor, more
specifically, does it appear that Congress intended to have this general protec-
tion withdrawn in situations in which a single employee, acting alone, partici-
pates in an integral aspect of a collective process . . . . [WIhat is consistent with
the Act's statement of purpose-is a congressional intent to create an equality in
bargaining power between the employee and the employer throughout the entire
process of labor organizing, collective bargaining, and enforcement of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreements.
Id. at 835.
Such a view and the policy analysis by the Court would arguably permit other forms of
individual activity asserting collective rights of work related interest-assertion of a stat-
utory right, infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text, and the individual furtherance of
a group concern, infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
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vidual employee involved in concerted activity under section
8(a) (1).1" °
The dissent in City Disposal correctly points out that the ma-
jority decision contributes little to the coordination problems of
redundancy, deferral, and preemption among employee rights
under federal labor law.' l The dissent's focus, however, is
skewed as well. The Board is not enforcing a contract right, even
though one may exist, but a statutory right and, as such, is en-
gaging in a more fundamental endeavor. The Board is denying
the employer the use of his discipline and discharge weapons to
silence a protest made by an individual employee regarding an
issue of concern to other workers. This is power balancing in its
most fundamental form in the furtherance of NLRA policy con-
cerns. The section 7 statutory right is the lowest common de-
nominator in furthering NLRA policy. It should be noted that
the dissent also fails to seriously address the coordination
problem.
The fourth classification includes an individual protesting a
right grounded in public policy articulations. Conceptually, this
classification parallels the City Disposal rationale. An individual
asserting a statutory right of work-related interest is an in-
tended beneficiary of the group activity, in this case the body-
politic, that originally produced the right.1 2 The current Board
has been hostile and often collapsed in its analysis under the
fourth classification.' Curiously, this group activity parallels
the most widely accepted and growing exception to the at-will
employment rule under state tort law. 1 4 As such, it may put em-
ployers in the peculiar position of arguing for concerted activity
classifications in order to preempt state tort actions and to limit
remedy exposure to backpay and reinstatement under the
110. See supra note 106.
111. The dissent, written by Justice O'Connor, was joined by Chief Justice Burger,
Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist. Five-to-four decisions, however, given the chang-
ing composition of the Court, should be viewed with caution. 465 U.S. at 841-47.
112. In Alleluia Cushion, 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975), the Board extended protection to
individual workers protesting a work-related interest in violation of existing public policy
as articulated in statutes. Alleluia Cushion was overruled by the Board in Meyers Indus-
tries (II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), setting the stage for an interesting confrontation with
state wrongful discharge actions. See supra note 104.
113. See infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
114. See LOPATKA & MARTIN, supra note 97, at 50-175. See generally Fick, supra note
100 (suggesting that the gaps in worker protection left by Meyers Industries may be
filled by statutory and common-law remedies).
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NLRA. 115 This further exemplifies the coordination problems in
labor law.
The final classification embraces an individual acting in fur-
therance of a group concern. Although contract rights and statu-
tory rights can be easily viewed as "group concerns", contract
rights and statutory rights present easier procedural require-
ments" than the broader and more elusive concept of group
concerns. The Board, at least in its present tenure, has closed
out protection for the individual acting- in furtherance of "group
concerns" by rejecting the Alleluia Cushion1 7 rationale in Mey-
ers Industries I1.1" In Meyers Industries If the Board adopted
a literal definition of concerted activities focusing on "two or
more acting in concert." Exercising their discretion in statutory
interpretation, the Board has declined to protect these individ-
ual employees acting in furtherance of a group concern."' 9 More-
over, Meyers Industries II can also be read to preclude protec-
tion for individual employees protesting in furtherance of
statutory rights as well. 20
In Meyers Industries II, the Board was careful not to ex-
pressly preclude all individual actions as beyond the "concerted"
element in section 8(a)(1) actions12' but, from a disciplined or
discharged employee's position the evidentiary burdens are sig-
nificant.122 As a matter of procedure, the Board has created an
implicit presumption that any individual action is, by definition,
115. See LOPATKA & MARTIN, supra note 97 at 377-411; see also Herman, Wrongful
Discharge Actions After Lueck and Metropolitan Life Insurance: The Erosion of Indi-
vidual Rights and Collective Strengths, 9 INDus. REL. L.J. 596 (1987); Wheeler &
Browne, Federal Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Actions, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1
(1986).
116. See NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822 at 831-32; see also Alle-
luia Cushion, 221 N.L.R.B. 999.
117. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975); see also infra note 119.
118. 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986).
119. Id. at 882, 887-88. The Board recognized that there are other permissible defini-
tions of concerted activity, a position arguably supported by City Disposal Systems, 465
U.S. 822. As such, with a new Administration in 1989 one can expect to see many Rea-
gan-Dotson Board decisions overturned or narrowly circumscribed. In fact one can argue
the Board is already slowly moving back toward the center, as evidenced by the number
of dissents filed by Member Dotson in 1987. Member Dotson left the Board in December
1987.
120. With the rejection of Alleluia Cushion, 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975), section 7 pro-
tection for individual employees asserting statutory rights is unclear. But see infra notes
121-22 and accompanying text.
121. 281 N.L.R.B. at 885.
122. The Board requires "observable evidence" of group action and "actual" group
interest. Meyers Industries I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 495-96 (1984), remanded, Prill v. NLRB,
755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Meyers Industries II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), aff'd, Prill
v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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unconcerted behavior with the sterile "form" of protest exalted
over the "substance" of the protest. The nature of the "group
concerns" is shifted, as one can argue it should be, to the second
and third threshold elements of the analysis. However, this may
create a "catch-22." The substance of the protest may not be
addressed until the employee overcomes the problems generated
by the individual form of protest.
As indicated above, satisfaction of the "concerted" element is
one of three threshold requirements for denying the employer
the prerogative to discipline or discharge for "good reason, for
no reason, or for reason morally wrong. 123 The second threshold
element is the "protected" versus "unprotected" status of the
employee's activities. As the Supreme Court indicated in City
Disposal, an activity can be concerted but, by the nature of the
employee's actions, be unprotected.2 4 The focus of the "pro-
tected" element is generally classified as a time, place, and man-
ner issue. 115
Although this area contains a myriad of factual patterns, a
continuum of behavior can be constructed. Drawing from the
concept of industrial justice, employee behavior that is unpro-
tected parallels the "for cause" or "just cause" discipline and
discharges. 2 6 If the activity in question is grounded in sound,
properly administered personnel policy, then the discipline or
discharge is allowable. Therefore, work-related behavior in viola-
tion of criminal statutes or specific NLRA policy anchors one
end of the continuum and is clearly unprotected.127 Moving
along the continuum, conduct approaching intentional torts
would similarly be viewed as unprotected as would activity in
contravention of existing contract provisions. 28 Toward the
other end of the continuum are employee protests presented in a
123. See supra note 97.
124. 465 U.S. 822, 837 (1984).
125. Rights granted in statutes are not absolute and must be analyzed in a factual
context. Akin to the analysis of constitutional rights, a shorthand categorization is the
analysis of time, place, and manner issues. Although passing under a variety of terminol-
ogy, the analysis involves a balancing scheme and is at the heart of NLRA
interpretation.
126. See NLRB v. Transp. Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (discussing the
allocation of evidentiary burdens in mixed motive discharges).
127. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (holding
the discharge of sit-down strikers proper because strike action was illegal).
128. Tort activity is far from settled. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 1229, International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers 346 U.S. 464 (1953); Squier Distrib. Co. v. Local 7, International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 801 F.2d 238 (6th Cir. 1986); Mitchell Manuels, 280 N.L.R.B. 230
(1986). Contravention of an existing contract term is more settled. NLRB v. City Dispo-
sal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 837 (1984).
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"harsh" manner, using opprobrious language, protests presented
in a "threatening" manner129 or the potentially unprotected and
equally ill-defined acts of "disloyalty" and "insubordination."' 30
It is in these latter areas that autocratic work rules emanating
from the command-obedience relationship of an earlier indus-
trial era, upon which the NLRA was built, are incorporated into
the analysis and must be accommodated with the policies of the
NLRA.
The weighing of interests involves balancing the employee's
section 7 rights to present worker concerns against the em-
ployer's power through discipline and discharge to further its
self interest in operating its business. But are they in fact
weighed at all? Adopting a narrow economic efficiency focus
clearly tilts the balance in favor of employers while giving short
shrift to other policy considerations. Recognizing the power bal-
ancing function of the NLRA, the Board and court construction
of the balance of interests must incorporate the unsophisticated
nature of employees' and the recognition that authoritarian or-
ganizational structures have little or no interest in communicat-
ing with employees.'32
The final threshold element in section 7 analysis is the "objec-
tive" or "purpose" of the protest. In this area the Board and the
129. See, e.g., Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984) enforced, 765
F.2d 148 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986); Pittsburgh Press Co., 234 N.L.R.B.
408 (1978); see also supra note 17.
130. The terms "disloyalty" and "insubordination" are catch-all terms of art and, by
themselves, convey little of the underlying fact pattern. In the industrial setting these
terms of art are, at best, merely organizing points in developing just cause; at worst, they
are smokescreens to hide inequitable employer activity. See supra notes 109-10.
131. Employees and labor organizations are often uninformed and may have limited
access to proper procedural requirements under the Act. So as not to exalt form over
substance, the Act should be interpreted with a recognition of the employees' limited
information base and the unsophisticated manner of presentation. The authoritarian or-
ganizational structure also must be recognized as playing a significant role in employees'
lives and livelihood. See supra note 44. Employees are conservative. They seek consis-
tency of return in their investment of time, labor, and talent through job security. Wages
at one time do not offset no wages at another time. Therefore, few employees will risk
job security to air protests unless they are afforded protection from employer power
exercises.
132. The business perspective is speculative. High profits at one time are offset by
low profits at another time. The employer desires to maintain the ability to move and
mix capital in furtherance of the better return. Self-interested private profit maximiza-
tion is accomplished by preserving an authoritarian organizational structure and a com-
mand-obedience relationship. Because these institutions are the products of human di-
rected actions, however, they are not based on rational behavior. Nor are many
distributive and corrective industrial justice systems based on merit and equity. Rather,
any attempt to impose standards upon or to raise a dissent against an authoritarian
organization is met with opposition. The concept of industrial democracy is viewed as a
threat to capital's control.
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courts have liberally interpreted the "for mutual aid and protec-
tion" language. As such, work-related protests are clearly within
the ambit of section 7.133 Additionally, and arguably furthering
the ideal of industrial democracy, protests may be within section
7 even if the purported objective is outside the direct control of
the employer, including such diverse concerns as political is-
sues 134 and union affairs. 35 Akin to the protected/unprotected
issues, employer discipline and discharge is allowed where the
protest furthers an unlawful objective or is in violation of a con-
tract restriction. 136
The concept of the "personal gripe," although exemplifying
the interdependent nature of these elements, is perhaps the
most troublesome area.13 7 The talisman raised is that of the
chronic complainer. A personal gripe, by definition, furthers per-
sonal rather than group interests; is unconcerted; and, if
presented in an unsophisticated and insubordinate manner, un-
protected as well. A lack of any one of the section 7 elements
will permit the exercise of discipline and discharge weapons;
however, such a blanket hands-off policy is problematic.
In the workplace personal gripes are often linked to perceived
inequities in the distributive and corrective industrial justice
systems. As such, redressing these protests often inures to the
benefit of the group as a whole even without its active approval
or participation. If outside the reach of section 7, legitimate
worker complaints can fail due to the unsophisticated nature of
the employee presentation. Conversely, allowing unfettered dis-
cipline and discharge in these areas can have a chilling effect on
future protests.1 8 The employer is not without a command-obe-
dience sanction. "Just cause" or "for cause" drawn from 10(c)
permits the discipline or discharge of chronic complainers not
for their act of complaining but rather for the running afoul of
time, place, and manner rules rooted in sound personnel policy
and practice.
133. See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
134. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); Kaiser Engineers v. NLRB,
538 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1976).
135. See, e.g., NLRB v. R.C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Nu-Car
Carriers, Inc., 189 F.2d 756 (3d Cir. 1951) cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). But see
AAL, Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 84 (1985); Certified Grocers of Illinois, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 1608
(1985); Energy Coal Income Partnership, 269 N.L.R.B. 770 (1984).
136. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50
(1975).
137. Purely personal individual gripes are not protected by the Act. See Capitol Or-
namental Concrete Specialties, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 851 (1980); see also NLRB v. City
Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 833 n.10 (1984).
138. See Unico Replacement Parts, Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 309 (1986).
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The concept of protected concerted activities turns on a fun-
damental disagreement between individual and group actions.
The current Board and many circuits take a literal dictionary
definition of "concerted. '"1 39 The result is a rather strange di-
chotomy in which actions, if taken individually, are subject to
employer discipline and discharge while identical behavior en-
gaged in by "at least two" would be within section 7 protec-
tions." ° Such an approach, as two preeminent labor law scholars
have argued, ignores the legislative history and policies of the
Act:
In terms of statutory construction, there are not two ab-
stract and distinguishable categories of action-individ-
ual action for self interest and collective action for group
interest-one which Congress chose not to protect and
the other which Congress chose to protect, but rather a
continuum of individual activity-of individuals choosing
to speak and act on their own behalf, singly and in small
and large groups. Thus, the narrow reading of the Act
proceeds upon a false dichotomy, for at the core of the
freedom of the individual to protest in a group necessa-
rily lies the freedom of the individual to protest at all.14 1
Assuming no "just cause" rationale rendering the protest un-
protected, Professors Gorman and Finkin further argue that
"[a]lthough the employer may refuse to entertain an employee's
presentation, nothing in the Act suggests it should be permitted
to discharge an employee for attempting to make that presenta-
tion." 2 The focus of inquiry, therefore, should fall on the pro-
tected/unprotected nature of the protest or the time, place, and
manner issues-an area requiring the substantive articulation of
the power relationships and the components of the interest
balance.
C. Express Power Controls
A major focus of the power balancing mechanisms of the
NLRA addresses the scope and content of labor's costs of disa-
greement or noncompliance. "Congress," wrote the Court in
139. See Meyers Industries II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986).
140. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 99, at 344.
141. Id. at 344-45 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 357.
FALL 1989]
Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 23:1
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union, "has been
rather specific when it has come to outlaw particular economic
weapons on the part of unions."143 The previous two sections of
this Article delineated the limits, carved out through judicial
construction of the NLRA, upon the employer's control over
unit work and its discipline and discharge power. At the outset,
it is important to note a shift in judicial construction. Although
the employer's costs of noncompliance are not channeled
through the collective bargaining process"" nor initially subject
to NLRA restrictions,' 5 virtually all such labor-exercised costs
are initially and fundamentally channeled through the collective
bargaining process, or restricted outright.
One can readily identify the power restrictions placed upon
labor organizations by the Act. The right to strike is granted in
section 13.41 The closed shop,'4 7 hot cargo clauses, 48 and feath-
erbedding 49 are restricted. The ability to engage in recognition
and organizational picketing," secondary strike and picketing
143. 361 U.S. 477, 498 (1960).
144. See supra Part IIA. on the treatment of corporate transformations as permis-
sive bargaining items.
145. See supra Part II.B. on the preservation of the discipline and discharge compo-
nent of the tradition based command-obedience relationship.
146. Section 13 of the Act provides: "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifi-
cally provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on
that right." 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982).
147. Pennello v. International Union, United Mine Workers, 88 F. Supp. 935 (D.D.C.
1950); see also National Labor Relations Act, § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982).
148. NLRB v. Amalgamated Lithographers, 309 F.2d 31 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 943 (1963); see also National Labor Relations Act, § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e)
(1982).
149. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6) (1982). See also
American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100 (1953); NLRB v. Gamble
Enter., Inc., 345 U.S. 117 (1953).
150. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1982).
The section does not ban the use of picketing outright but restricts its use if directed
to the listed proscribed objectives. A proviso to 8(b)(7) provides that informational pick-
eting "for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an
employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization"
shall not be constrained by this section unless the picketing has the secondary effect of
"induc[ing] any individual employed by any other person in the course of his employ-
ment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services." See
NLRB v. Local 3, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 317 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1963); Cox,
The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L.
REV. 257, 262-70 (1959) [hereinafter Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments]; Cox,
Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574, 594-95 (1951); see also
NLRB v. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 434 U.S. 335 (1978); Connell Constr.
Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); National Labor Relations
Act, § 8(b)(4)(C)-(D), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(C)-(D) (1982). See generally Modjeska,
Recognition Picketing Under the NLRA, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 633 (1983).
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activity,"' and secondary boycotts 15 2 is similarly impaired by the
Act. Limited jurisdictional reach and unit determination signifi-
cantly impair labor's ability to organize and coordinate mutual
and unified collective fronts.'53 Mere listing, however, does not
convey the complexity, nor the furtherance of legislative policy
through judicial construction, of these power exercises. It is use-
ful, therefore, to view these restrictions on labor's power exer-
cises and their judicial construction in a power context juxta-
posed against the previously discussed employer responses.
Labor's power function directly relates to its ability to impair
the targeted employer's ability to remain economically viable.
The employer considers all organizational resources and support
structures in countering labor's actions. Labor's ability to im-
pose costs of noncompliance upon the employer, however, can-
not be viewed as limited to internal work stoppages, albeit la-
bor's most significant locus of pressure, but must be viewed in
an external support/pressure context as well. Similarly, employ-
ers utilize both internal and external responses. External re-
sponses extend the locus of the dispute to embrace consumers,
other sympathetic employees, other, possibly neutral, employers
(suppliers and distributors), ally employers, and other outside
support personnel and replacement employees. The NLRA's
treatment of power exercises in the internal and external con-
texts limits the scope of permissible power exercises in the labor
arsenal thereby impacting its ability to counter or weather an
employer's actions.
With exceptions, 54 the NLRA does not render the traditional
economic weapons available to labor per se illegal, but imposes
151. National'Labor Relations Act, § 8(b)(4)(A)-(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4)(A)-(B)
(1982); see also infra notes 164-88 and accompanying text.
152. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1982); see
also infra notes 164-88 and accompanying text.
153. See generally National Labor Relations Act, § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982) defin-
ing jurisdictional limitations and exempt employees. See, e.g., Comment, Industrial De-
mocracy and the Managerial Employee Exception to the National Labor Relations Act,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 441 (1985).
The Board has broad discretion in determining the appropriate bargaining unit. Unit
composition can have a significant impact upon the initial certification of the union, its
ability to fend off a decertification drive, and its ability to secure a collective bargaining
agreement. See National Labor Relations Act, § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982); see also 6
Fed. Reg. Empl. Serv. (Law. Co-op) §§ 51:84-145 (revised ed. 1984). See generally J.
ABODEELY, THE NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT (Labor Relations and
Public Policy Series No. 3, 1971). For a discussion of labor's ability to coordinate bar-
gaining and present unified fronts in the face of growing multiplant and conglomerate
operations see Atleson, supra note 9; see also Note, Multi-Unit Collective Bargaining:
Autonomy and Dependence in Liberal Thought, 72 GEo. L. J. 1369 (1984).
154. See supra notes 147-49.
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limits on the use of such weapons when directed toward statuto-
rily prohibited, predominately external, objectives. Both the pol-
icy and effect behind the Act's labor power controls are to rein
in and internalize the dispute. This policy and effect also ap-
pears in the statutory limits on jurisdiction, unit determination,
and the treatment of the mandatory-permissive bargaining item
dichotomy. In this context, the dispute is localized, neutrals are
ostensibly protected, and the labor confrontation is managed
with a restricted, internal, field of play.1"5 External labor power
exercises are countered, not necessarily by employer power re-
sponses, but by the power of the state allowing injunctive and
monetary relief.156
Predominant among the "reining in" provisions is section
8(b)(4) 157 proscribing two types of conduct: (i) "to engage in, or
to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person
• . . in" [1] a strike or [2] refusal to use or otherwise handle
155. The fostering of collective bargaining and its mediating effects on industrial dis-
putes is an identifiable NLRA policy goal. In internalizing the dispute, disruptions to
interstate commerce are thereby contained, and, through limitations on power exercises,
their intensity mitigated. But the concept of private ordering of disputes creates a policy
dilemma. In channeling the dispute to collective bargaining, the Act must not only com-
pel attendance and provide a remedy, but must deny other, potentially more efficient,
means of achieving the individual party's goals. Private ordering only works efficiently if
all power exercises are channeled through the collective-bargaining process or denied
outright.
Success at the bargaining table is not the only employer goal. Although labor is depen-
dent upon employer survival for its survival, the employer is not necessarily dependent
upon the survival of the union. Regrettably, employers have never fully embraced the
concept of collective bargaining and industrial democracy, viewing the destruction of em-
ployee collective representation as desirable. See Summers, supra note 3, at 15-18. More-
over, the remedial structure of the NLRA is inadequate to compel compliance; cease and
desist orders tend to have little effect on recalcitrant organizations.
156. The Board views secondary activity and the similarly structured recognition and
organizational picketing as having high priority and will attempt to complete its investi-
gation within 72 hours. See generally National Labor Relations Act, § 10(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(1) (1982). If substantial evidence is present, the Board can request that an injunc-
tion be issued. Id.; see also San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild v. Kennedy, 412
F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1969) (evidentiary standard for 10(1) injunction). Monetary damage
actions may also be available to the aggrieved employer. NLRA section 303, 29 U.S.C.
§ 187(b) (1982); see C & K Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 704 F.2d 690 (3d Cir.
1983) (holding that strike benefits paid to secondary strikers is proof that union sup-
ported activity); Sacramento Valley Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers, 637 F. Supp. 1417 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that section 303 requires a
'but for' standard of proof in linking damage to unlawful motive/objective).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982). See generally Bush, Customers, Coercion and
Congressional Intent: Regulating Secondary Consumer Boycotts Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 1127 (1984); Lesnick, Job Security and Second-
ary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA Sections 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1000
(1965); Rubin, The Primary-Secondary Distinction Without the Primary: The New Sec-
ondary Boycott Law of Allied International, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Asso-
ciation, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 94 (1984).
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goods in commerce or, [3] refusal to perform services; or (ii) "to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person" where an object thereof
is: (A) forcing an employer to join a labor or employer associa-
tion or to enter into a "hot cargo" (section 8(e)) 158 agreement;
(B) forcing any neutral (secondary) person to cease doing busi-
ness with any other person or forcing another employer to recog-
nize an uncertified union; (C) forcing an employer to recognize
or bargain with a union in defiance of another's certification; or
(D) forcing any employer to assign particular work to one group
of employees rather than another unless authorized by Board or-
der or certification.
To accommodate the first amendment concerns of free speech,
these express restrictions under section 8(b)(4) are tempered by
provisos 59 allowing two forms of external labor pressure sup-
port. First, sympathy strikes and the refusal to cross lawful
picket lines are not rendered unlawful by section 8(b)(4).110 Sec-
ond, truthfully advising the public, including consumers and
other labor organizations, that products produced by the pri-
mary employer are distributed by a neutral (secondary) em-
ployer is protected so long as the publicity does not have the
effect of forcing any neutral (secondary) person to cease doing
business with any other person (section 8(b)(4)(B))."'6
158. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
160. Id.
[Niothing contained in this subsection [(b)] shall be construed to make unlawful
a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer (other than
his own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a strike
ratified or approved by a representative of such employees ....
Id.
161. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1982).
[N]othing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity,
other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including
consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are
produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dis-
pute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not
have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the
primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver,
or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of
the employer engaged in such distribution.
Id.
Labor union representatives may lawfully follow a struck product to its distribution
points and picket so long as the pickets are product specific and do not have an unlawful
secondary objective. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377
U.S. 58 (1964); see also Catalytic, Inc. v. Monmouth & Ocean County Bldg. Trades
Council, 829 F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 1987).
See generally Goldman, The First Amendment and Nonpicketing Labor Publicity
Under Section8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1469
(1983); Harper, The Consumer's Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne Hard-
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These allowable external pressure mechanisms, however, are
not without difficulty in practice. Sympathy strikers are treated
as economic strikers and can be permanently replaced."6 2 More-
over, contract restrictions and improper time, place, and manner
issues can result in the activity being unprotected and subject to
employer discipline and discharge.16 3 The publicity proviso is
similarly not a panacea for labor. A balancing of employer prop-
erty interests against the union right of information dissemina-
tion can impair labor's ability to effectively publicize the dis-
pute.161 Second, the phrasing of the publicity can be such that it
must cease doing business with the "neutral" and be unpro-
tected.16 5 Finally, the time, place, and manner of distribution
can run afoul of state public safety protections. 
1 6
ware and Its Implications for American Labor Law, 93 YALE L. J. 409 (1984); St. An-
toine, Free Speech or Economic Weapon? The Persisting Problem of Picketing, 16 SUF-
FOLK U. L. REV. 883 (1982); Note, Secondary Boycotts and the First Amendment, 51 U.
CHi. L. REv. 811 (1984).
162. See Newberry Energy Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 436 (1976); Gould Corp., 237
N.L.R.B. 881 (1978), enforcement denied on other grounds, 638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir.
1980). The employer's rationale to justify permanent replacement of sympathy strikers
balanced against the statutory right to engage in concerted activity is more closely scru-
tinized than for economic strikers. See General Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d
257 (1st Cir. 1971). But no consistent standard has emerged. See NLRB v. William S.
Carroll, Inc., 578 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978).
163. The statutory right to honor picket lines can be waived, rendering the activity
unprotected and subject to employer discipline and discharge. See NLRB v. Rockaway
News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953); see also Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 273
N.L.R.B. 1715 (1985), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Local 1395, International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 797 F.2d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Cf. Local 803, International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 826 F.2d 1283 (3d Cir. 1987). In addition to the time,
place, and manner issues of individual employee conduct rendering the activity unpro-
tected, the picket line honored must have a lawful, protected status. Ignorance of the
picket line status is no defense to employer discipline and discharge. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 556 (1977).
164. The balance articulated parallels the inquiry in union literature distribution
cases. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Fairmont Hotel Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 139
(1986). The issues arising in this area are fact-sensitive and pose exceptionally difficult
questions of law and policy. See e.g., Homart Development Co., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 72,
1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,053 (Oct. 15, 1987) (striking balance in favor of em-
ployer property interests); Center Street Market, Inc, d.b.a Medina Super Duper, 286
N.L.R.B. No. 73, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,050 (Oct, 15 1987) (striking balance
in favor of employee rights); L & L Shop Rite, Inc., 285 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 1987-1988
NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,026 (Sept. 24, 1987) (restricting union to public sidewalk is ade-
quate alternative means to communicate message).
165. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U.S. 147 (1983); Hospital & Serv.
Employees Union, Local 399 v. NLRB, 743 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1984). This is particularly
troublesome when the publicity is accompanied by picketing. See Bedding, Curtain &
Drapery Workers Union Local 140, 164 N.L.R.B. 271 (1967), enforced, 390 F.2d 495 (2d
Cir. 1968); Local 248 Meat & Allied Food Workers, 230 N.L.R.B. 189 (1977).
166. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284,
293 (1957).
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Courts have found the distinction between primary activities
and the secondary activities of neutral employers particularly
troublesome. The distinction between legal primary activity and
illegal secondary activity, as the Court stated, is rarely "a glar-
ingly bright line." '67 Labor power exercises used against primary
employers are proper, although the same weapons and tactics
used against secondary, ostensibly neutral, employers may be an
unfair labor practice. 6 8 Thus, in a textbook case, it would be
unlawful for a labor union to strike employer A for the purpose
of forcing that employer to cease doing business with employer
B. ' 9 Likewise, it would be unlawful for the union to boycott em-
ployer A because employer A does business with employer B
with whom the union has a dispute. 7 ° But activity can be sec-
ondary even if the activity is directed against the primary em-
ployer.17 ' Activity is considered secondary if an objective, not
necessarily the predominate one, is to force a cessation of, or
change in, the business relationship between two independent
entities.7 2 Thus, the focus of the inquiry is the labor union ob-
jective in exercising power. To aid in the detbrmination, the
Board has developed a "right to control" test.' If the employer
lacks control over the object or issue in dispute, the union activi-
ties will likely be viewed as secondary.
174
Secondary activity, however, rarely follows the simple defini-
tional lines articulated above. In addition to the difficulty of de-
termining the union's objective, the 8(b)(4) provisos further
complicate this inquiry by allowing limited external support or
167. Local 761, International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 673
(1961).
168. Section 8(b)(4)(B) (29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1982)) is designed to preserve the
right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary
labor disputes and shield unoffending employers and others from pressures not of their
own making. A proviso reads "nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to
make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing."
See also H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1959).
169. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947).
170. Id.
171. NLRB v. Pipefitters Local 628, 429 U.S. 507 (1977); see also NLRB v. Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n, 764 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, if the primary em-
ployer is simply caught in the middle of a dispute between two unions the secondary
activity provisions may apply. See National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 342 F.2d 538 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 835 (1965); National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 411
(D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (lr35).
172. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
173. NLRB v. Enterprise Assoc. of Steamfitters Local 638, 429 U.S. 507, 523 n.ll
(1977); see also Leslie, Right to Con'rol: A Study in Secondary Boycotts and Labor
Antitrust, 89 HARV. L. REV. 904 (1976,.
174. 429 U.S. at 521-24.
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pressure through the honoring of picket lines and information
dissemination. 175 Recall that even if the activities are outside the
restrictions of 8(b)(4), they still can be unprotected and subject
to employer discipline and discharge.
176
The question of what is a "neutral" is not without power-bal-
ancing implications. Unions can follow struck work to allies of
the primary employer without running afoul of the secondary
activity ban. 77 If labor's aim is to impose a significant cost of
noncompliance on the employer, an effective way of doing so is
to constrain its supply and distribution outlets. Clearly, how-
ever, external pressure against suppliers and distributors of the
primary employer, outside the publicity proviso, is illegal.' 7  But
a more fundamental question remains. Can external union pres-
sure be brought against the other parts of a larger enterprise, or
are the subparts "neutral" employers? With the rise of mergers
and conglomerate enterprises the supply and distribution facets,
as well as an integrated financial position, are housed within a
multi-faceted organizational structure. Surely the organizational
structure is designed to counter pressure from the various mar-
kets it serves. One might argue that an employer cannot be
forced to cease doing business with another if the another is a
part of itself and, in reality, the same employer.
The Board views common ownership as insufficient to free un-
ions from the secondary activity prohibitions.'79 Instead of look-
ing solely to common ownership, the Board seemingly requires
common control, ownership, and an integration of operations
and policies.88 Thus, union power exercises against parts of a
larger corporate whole are illegal secondary activity. Such a bal-
ancing of employer organizational prerogatives against employee
collective interests, through judicial construction rather than ex-
press statutory command, clearly disadvantages labor while leav-
175. See supra, notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
176. See supra, notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
177. NLRB v. Business Mach. & Office Appliance Mechanics Conference Bd. Local
459, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956); see also Local 456,
Teamsters Union, 273 N.L.R.B. 516, 519 (1984); 7 Fed. Reg. Empl. Serv. (Law. Co-op)
§§ 60:61-97 (1982); Levin, "Wholly Unconcerned": The Scope and Meaning of the Ally
Doctrine Under Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 283 (1970); Comment,
Unions, Conglomerates, and Secondary Activity Under the NLRA, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
221 (1980).
178. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
179. Miami Newspaper Pressmens's Local 46 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Local 456, Teamsters Union, 273 N.L.R.B. 516 (1984); Los Angeles Newspaper Guild,
Local 69, 185 N.L.R.B. 303 (1970), enforced, 443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1018 (1972).
180. See supra notes 177, 179.
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ing the employer's ability to manipulate organizational structure
to its power advantage unfettered.'
Section 13 of the Act grants labor the right to strike. But the
strike protection is viewed narrowly, reining in labor's most sig-
nificant power exercise even in the internal labor dispute arena.
"[T~he right to strike is predicated upon the conclusion that a
strike when legitimately employed is an economic weapon which
in great measure implements and supports the principles of the
collective bargaining system."'8 2 The question of when the strike
weapon is "legitimately" employed parallels the discussion of
protected vis-A-vis unprotected activities.8 3 The time, place, and
manner issues in strike activity are balanced against the em-
ployer's interests in operating its business. 84 As such, strike ac-
tivities conducted in a "harsh" manner, using opprobrious, or
threatening language or gestures are unprotected.'8 5 Moreover,
related work stoppage weapons, including slowdowns, sitdowns,
and partial strikes, are generally deemed unprotected and sub-
ject to employer discipline and discharge but not necessarily
Board sanction. 86
Even if the strike activity is conducted in a legitimate time,
place, and manner, as with all power exercises, the strike activity
is juxtaposed against an employer's response. The Mackay doc-
trine, drawn from dicta in an early Supreme Court case,8 7 al-
lows employers to hire permanent replacements for striking em-
ployees and retain permanent replacements in lieu of strikers
181. See generally Atleson, supra note 9; Comment, supra note 177.
182. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233-34 (1963).
183. See supra notes 130-39; see also Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044
(1984). See generally J. ATLESON, supra note 20, at 19-34.
184. See, e.g., Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. 1044.
185. Id.
186. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (finding slow-
downs unprotected but not an unfair labor practice under 8(b)(3)); NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (finding sitdowns unprotected); Goya Foods,
Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 1465 (1978) (finding intermittent work stoppages unprotected); Elk
Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950) (regarding slowdowns); Scott Paper Box Co., 81
N.L.R.B. 535 (1949) (refusing overtime). But see Teledyne Wis. Motor v. Local 283
UAW, 530 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding strike protected if pursuant to contract
right).
187. NLRB v Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
Although section 13 [of the act, 29 U.S.C.A. 163] provides, "Nothing in this Act
[chapter] (sic) shall be construed so as (sic) to interfere with or impede or di-
minish in any way the right to strike," it does not follow that an employer, guilty
of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the right to protect and continue his
business by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to
discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter
to resume their employment, in order to create places for them.
304 U.S. at 345-46.
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seeking to resume their employment. Thus, in a judicial sleight
of hand, the right to strike is ostensibly protected. Although an
employer is expressly prohibited under section 8(a)(1) and (3)
from disciplining and discharging striking employees, he can
permanently replace them in his workforce.'
The distinction between being permanently replaced and be-
ing discharged is lost on most employees. The employer is, of
course, prohibited from discriminatorily denying reemployment
to the replaced worker.189 The replaced worker continues as an
"employee" until rehired, or until she finds suitable substitute
employment, and is relieved of employment selection process
hurdles, can vote in representational elections within twelve
months of severance, and has preferential recall rights.190 Eco-
nomic reality, however, will induce even the most diehard union
member to seek other means of support during this interim pe-
riod. 91 A right to permanently replace striking workers, read in
context with sections' 7 and 13 protections from interference
with lawful concerted activity, raises significant NLRA policy
problems because, as one noted labor law scholar observed, "one
can conceive of few interferences greater than permanent re-
placement for striking.
' '1 92
The court's balancing of interests in the context of replace-
ment merits closer examination. The employer's interest in con-
tinued operations apparently outweighs the employee's interest
in collective action free from employer interference. Even
though the articulation is defensible, before ceding to the em-
ployer such a significant economic weapon, one must examine
the particular substantive components and alternatives. The em-
ployer is not required to seek a less intrusive means of continu-
188. Id. at 346. See generally Gillespie, The Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of Busi-
ness Necessity, 50 TEX. L. REV. 782 (1972); Hirsch, Laidlaw-The Mackay Legacy, 4 GA.
L. REV. 808 (1970); Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misno-
mer- "Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEx. L. REv. 378 (1969).
189. 304 U.S. at 346.
190. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967); Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d
99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
191. Subject to the peculiarities of state law, permanently replaced workers, at the
termination of the strike, will be entitled to the same benefit treatment as laid off em-
ployees. Even with this limited assistance and the placement on a preferential recall list,
most workers will seek other employment. If the employer bypasses the recall list, he
must show that the position now held by the replaced worker has comparable salary,
benefits, and working conditions and that the worker did not intend to return to his old
job even if offered. Aluminum Welding & Mach. Works, 282 N.L.R.B. 396 (1986); Lone
Star Indus., 279 N.L.R.B. 550 (1986).
192. J. ATLESON, supra note 20, at 25.
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ing operations (e.g., operating with support personnel and tem-
porary labor).' 93 The employer has available countermeasures
ranging from ceasing operations, to operating with support and
temporary personnel, to operating with permanent replace-
ments; and no distinction is made between the impact on pro-
tected statutory rights by the exercise of different weapons. 94
The larger questions of economic necessity-impact on the
ongoing collective bargaining relationship and continuity of the
bargaining unit-are not addressed. It is only when the em-
ployer excessively sweetens the terms of employment for the
permanent replacements, to the additional disadvantage of
striking employees and the collective bargaining process, that
the balance favors the collective interests of the employees.'95
In contrast, while the employer is granted the most effective
and destructive counter against employee exercises of collective
action, related strike weapons, such as secondary pressure, slow-
downs, sit-ins, and partial strikes, which one can argue are situa-
tionally effective, are simply denied to labor. Viewed against this
judicial balancing of power, the statutory right to strike under
section 13 rings hollow.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Judicial construction of the NLRA manifests itself in at least
four analytical representations. First, certain power exercises are
simply defined out of legal but not necessarily practical signifi-
cance.' For example, only labor-cost-motivated employer trans-
formations are subject to the reach of section 8(d). Other trans-
formations that purport to alter the scope and direction of the
enterprise,'97 or which are not amenable to "resolution through
193. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). See also Gillespie,
supra note 188; C. PERRY, A. KRAMER, & T. SCHNEINDER, OPERATING DURING STRIKES:
COMPANY EXPERIENCE, NLRB POLICIES, AND GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS (1982).
194. See supra note 20.
195. See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (granting superseni-
ority to replacements an unfair labor practice); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388
U.S. 26 (1967) (finding that employers cannot discriminate between qualified strikers
and replacements in the denial of benefits). It is an unlawful refusal to bargain to offer
replacements higher wages than striking workers. Burlington Homes, 246 N.L.R.B. 1029
(1979); Glazers Wholesale Drug Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 1063 (1974), enforced, 523 F.2d 1053
(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 913 (1976). But see Omaha Typographical Union v. NLRB,
545 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1976); Service Electric Co., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 107 (1986); Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Independant Fed. of Flight Attendants, 109 S. Ct. 1225 (1989).
196. See, e.g., Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984); see also supra note 18.
197. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223-25 (1964).
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the bargaining process,"198 are theoretically left to private order-
ing. But, as argued earlier, with labor power constrained as a
matter of law, not as a matter of economic strength, labor's posi-
tion is structurally disadvantaged in power confrontations with
the employer. Similar treatment appears in the protected/unpro-
tected activity distinctions.
Even where the attempt to define certain power exercises out
of existence through the use of threshold determinations is un-
successful, the alternate methodology embraces a benefits-bur-
dens analysis where the "benefit for labor-management relations
• ..outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the busi-
ness."199 But employer interests are represented in both the "la-
bor-management relations" side of the equation and the "con-
duct of business" side, thereby structurally weighing the balance
in favor of employers by counting their interests on both sides of
the equation. 00 As argued earlier, the representation of interests
is problematic in all benefits-burdens analyses.
Third, certain employer power exercises are evaluated on a
motivational or totality of circumstances representation.0 ' For
example, the employer's conduct in discharging union adherents
under 8(a)(3) is evaluated on an affirmative antiunion animus
basis.20 2 Many determinations of bad-faith bargaining are simi-
larly evaluated according to a totality of conduct or circum-
stances approach.20 3 Fourth, certain conduct is viewed as inher-
ently destructive or a per se infringement upon protected
employee rights.20 ' For example, the Board and the courts have
recognized some conduct at the bargaining table as a per se vio-
lation of section 8(a)(5).20 5 Moreover, some retaliatory tactics
utilized by employers in response to concerted activities are
198. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678-79 (1981).
199. Id. at 679.
200. See supra note 20.
201. See, e.g., NLRB v. Advanced Business Forms Corp., 474 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1973);
Cannady v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1972); Solo Cup Co. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 447
(4th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
202. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982); see, e.g., Cannady v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 583 (10th Cir.
1972); see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). If an action
has a natural, foreseeable consequence or is inherently destructive of union activities, the
motive element may be inferred. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26
(1967); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
203. See supra note 201.
204. See, e.g., Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); H.J. Heinz Co. v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941); Teamsters Local 688 v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1985).
205. See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Teamsters Local 688 v.
NLRB, 756 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1985).
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deemed "inherently destructive" of protected rights in violation
of 8(a)(3).2 °6
But what does it mean when the Board or court states that a
power exercise is, for example, "inherently destructive" or "de-
fined out of existence?" Regardless of the representation made,
a power balancing determination is made. Classifying an activity
as "inherently destructive" or an unquestioned "employer com-
mand-obedience prerogative" is simply a shorthand substitution
for a more detailed balancing analysis. In the former, the bal-
ance is struck in favor of employee interests; in the latter, the
balance is struck in favor of employer interests. But is the short-
hand correctly utilized in the fact-sensitive and policy-rich areas
of labor management confrontations? The shorthand analysis in-
vites manipulation of issue definition on the part of interested
parties exploiting power control loopholes.2"7 Although such
shorthand utilizations are necessary to the operation of labor
law, the dynamic nature of labor law requires constant recogni-
tion of the underlying policy rationales and their links to control
of power.
The writings of Professor Commons and the institutional per-
spective offer insight into the dynamic processes involved.208
Any primer must define and articulate the scope of the policy
and purpose of the NLRA,
for which the artificial mechanism in question [collective
bargaining process/private ordered dispute resolution]
was designed, fashioned, and remodeled . . . whether [it]
• . . accomplishes that purpose [policy rationales of the
NLRA] in an efficient or economical way, and, if not[,]
what is the limiting factor out of the thousands of coop-
erating factors [environmental/mitigation impacts], that
obstructs the operation, and to what extent that limiting
factor [power exercise] can be and requires to be con-
trolled in order to facilitate the mechanism and accom-
plish its purpose. Then it adopts or changes the shop
206. See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); Radio Officers'
Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); see also supra note 202.
207. If an employer can define corporate transformation issues in a non-labor cost
basis he can avoid the mandatory bargaining obligation. Similarly, economic rationales
can be used to rebut antiunion animus. See, e.g., Shell Ray Mining, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B.
No. 41, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,054 (Sept. 30, 1987). Issue definition is an
exercise of power. Employers can be expected to exploit these areas. The most workable
solution, therefore, is to close off as many areas as possible to manipulation.
208. See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text. See generally Zimarowski, supra
note 41.
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rules, working rules, common law or statute law [judicial
construction] that regulates the actions and transactions
of the participants."0 9
In the judicial or legislative balancing process21 the "limiting
or strategic" factors (Table I's Power Sources) are manipulated
to achieve legislative policy or purpose. From this general pro-
cess theory comes understanding of the system's construction.
Theory, however, is useful only if it can be linked back to practi-
cal application. One must ask whether the manipulation of the
limiting or strategic factor(s) in fact produce the desired pur-
pose, or whether the combination of unrestrained strategic and
cooperating/complementary factors interacting in the dynamics
of the system distorts policy achievement.
In adopting an institutional methodology, the evaluation of
factors interacting to achieve a particular purpose is drawn from
case performance in a power balancing context. This perform-
ance base, across the multidisciplinary areas in labor/employ-
ment law, requires methodological uniformity of inquiry. In this
endeavor, the scope of legislative purpose and policy, including
both the economic and noneconomic policy articulations, must
be affirmatively incorporated into the balancing analysis. Sec-
ond, there must be an articulation of the particular factors inter-
acting in the conflict situation. Third, these factors must be
sorted out to determine which power exercises (Table I) are stra-
tegic or limiting, and which are environmental or mitigating fac-
tors (outside the volitional control of the parties in conflict).
When placed in the context of the NLRA, a distinction must be
recognized between those that are legislatively controlled and
those controlled through judicial construction.
These factors, it must be recognized, are operating in a dy-
namic system. As Professor Commons argued, the strategic fac-
tors (control of particular power exercises) are situational. They
are not cumulative at a given point in time, but successive dur-
ing a sequence in time-changing as parties shift power (utiliz-
ing dynamic feedback loops) to exploit structural weaknesses
and imbalances in their opposition, and as environmental and
209. J. COMMONS, supra note 13, at 377; see also supra note 52.
210. Much of the balancing under the NLRA is left to the Board and the courts. The
interpretation and construction of the Act initially is vested in the expertise of the
Board. As such, their decisions and interpretations are afforded great deference. See,
e.g., Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, Meyers Industries, Inc.




mitigating factors change the fabric of the system.21 For exam-
ple, two judicially created power loci, the Mackay replacement
doctrine and the mandatory-permissive bargaining item dichot-
omy, had a minor impact upon the fulfillment of NLRA legisla-
tive policy and purpose in the 1960s.21 Due to the changing so-
cial-economic-political conditions, however, these factors, at this
point in time, have a significant impact upon policy achieve-
ment. Thus, the system is in constant flux, particularly in the
judicially created power control areas, and must be examined at
both the particularized conflict level and in the overall power
balancing paradigm.
Judicial power balancing is always at risk as new data is accu-
mulated and incorporated into the balancing analysis. The util-
ity of the institutional methodological approach is to constantly
rework the power balancing function of the NLRA to adjust and
counter the use of factors deleterious to NLRA policy achieve-
ment. The burden placed upon the courts, and particularly an
impartial and professional Board,21 3 are significant. Neverthe-
less, such a broad-based approach is commanded by the complex
and often conflicting bargaining, managerial, and rationing
transactions incorporated within the ambit of the NLRA.
CONCLUSION
The National Labor Relations Act has not been significantly
amended in thirty years.2 "' As many observers have stated, the
power balancing mechanisms are in need of modification due to
211. J. COMMONS, supra note 42, at 628.
212. In the 1960s, the low unemployment rate fueled by a war driven economy as well
as structural differences in the need for skilled labor muted an employer's ability to
replace striking workers. The mandatory bargaining item classification was viewed
broadly even after Fibreboard Paper Prod. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), supra note 87.
213. Board politics have always played a role in labor-management relations. Con-
trary to some labels, there has never been a "pro-labor" Board, but only variations to the
right of the ideological center. Under the direction of Chairman Dotson, however, the
Board was viewed as more pro-employer than in previous Republican administrations.
The political gamesmanship played by administrations with the Board contributes to its
lack of continuity and predictability in decision making. See generally Address by
Charles Morris, Board Procedures, Remedies and the Enforcement Process, at the Con-
ference on The Labor Board at Mid-Century (Oct. 4, 1985) (summarized in BNA Daily
Lab. Rep. No. 196 at A-9 (Oct. 9, 1985)).
214. The last significant amendments to the NLRA were from the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. See Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amend-
ments, supra note 150. The moderate changes proposed in the Labor Reform Act of 1978
were filibustered in the U.S. Senate.
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the dynamic changes in society.215 A premise underlying the pre-
ceding presentation, and in fact underlying the NLRA, is that
conflict between employers and employees is inevitable, and that
the best way of resolving the deleterious effects of conflict is
through power balancing. With the recent economic instability
and structural changes, the possibility of cooperative relation-
ships replacing the old competitive and conflict relationships has
been raised. Like most idealistic propositions, this one has more
emotional than pragmatic appeal.
In the current employer-employee power balance, the coopera-
tive model is a cruel and exploited myth. Cooperation is simply
economic coercion passing under a more dignified, but transpar-
ent, label. Cooperative approaches only work in systems of rough
power parity or balance. As this Article has argued, the present
industrial relations power system is imbalanced. Employers
have, and have always had, the greater power. Their interests
have always been, and will continue to be, in conflict with the
interests of employees. Given the structural imbalance of power
now present in the construction of the NLRA, employers simply
have additional, effective, sources of power to achieve their pri-
vate interests.
As Frederick Douglass observed," 6 power, be it economic,
physical, or moral, concedes nothing without a demand backed
by countervailing power. Such a proposition is equally true to-
day. The question is not how do we completely eliminate conflict
and power inequality from labor-management relations, for that
cannot be done in a free society. Rather, through the construc-
tion of the bargaining, managerial, and rationing transactions,
how much power imbalance will we tolerate in furtherance of the
public good?
215. See, e.g., Craver, The NLRA at Fifty: From Youthful Exuberance to Middle
Aged Complacency, 39 LAB. L.J. 604 (1985); Mikva, Hard Times for Labor, 7 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 345 (1985); Page, The Rise, Decline, and Resurrection of American Labor Law: A
Critical Assessment of the NLRA at Age Fifty, 39 LAB. L.J. 594 (1985); see also Craver,
The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the Twenty-First Century, 1983 U.
ILL. L. REV. 633 (1983). See generally The Labor Board at Mid-Century, supra note 213.
216. See supra, note 1 and accompanying text.
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